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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the Order dated December 3, 1987, of the Utah Supreme Court, 
and also pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2A-3(2)(h) (1987)• 
The Judgment appealed from is final and appealable as certified 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
This is an appeal following the granting of a Summary 
Judgment in favor of defendant-respondent Salt Lake County/Salt 
Lake County Mental Health. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR DECISION ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly grant Summary 
Judgment based upon the evidence before the Court of the 
parties1 intentions concerning the negotiation of an express 
reservation of subrogation rights to Safeco? 
2. Did the trial court err in requiring evidence 
of the intent of the parties concerning the interpretation 
of the 1981 Lease Agreement and in not ruling as a matter of 
law that Salt Lake County (tenant and lessee) is a coinsured 
of Fashion Place Investors (landlord and lessor) due to the 
provision in the Lease requiring Fashion Place Investors to 
obtain fire insurance for the building? 
-1-
3 ~'l l-\ ! rial court properly rule as a matter 
of la*.* t'.'it the ovfr-r-rr — r-~ "ie^  constitutec a, pre-loss 
i; ra ::i J r 
subrogation rights? 
4 :.d the t:'ial cour 
rafer-1 • ---ibrocrati ™. claims '^^rr ~~ 
owners of the building? 
STA TEME1 IT C F TI IE • : I SE 
A. Nature of the Action 
This is ?.n action ror property damage ari cusir^ / 
: nterrupt ion ar:.-::!/f cu r r*r \ ^i: * ^  'r ' " " -
_coated ... ;:urra\ , I,L.;- x-iendarit/respondent Salt LdKe County 
Mental Health ('hereinafter fi'alt \r "\>untyM) was a ^ m a r - n 
case _ir«. , . . . ... .<_;., , ..titcwi 
p a r t n e r s h i p owning t n e j i u i i i i n g ( h e r ° :n:sf t e r " c u r r e n t owner") ; 
feu: d e n t i s t s who o r i a i n a l l y own- 1 *ho B u i l d i n g a- * 
*" * -* ' -, - * , t 
e::e ciir.~ . . -..:. ; ; : . c ; :;.. . ^ . . j e r t A n d e i ^ . ^ Barlo * I 
Packer, rriandc '" -crrcv/s, Dr. Carlson Terry 
(hereinafter the "partnership11 or "prior owners11) | the 
r o p e r1y dismiss a1 ] o f 
"" ~ **
u
 -r rl T : rn arose oi it 
- . . former 
insurer for the current owners and the Partnership, Safeco 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Safeco"). 
Salt Lake County moved for Summary Judgment on two 
alternative grounds: (1) Salt Lake County was a coinsured 
under the Safeco insurance policy, and therefore, no right of 
subrogation could arise in favor of Safeco against Salt Lake 
County; and (2) that specific provisions in the 1981 Lease 
Agreement between the current owner and Salt Lake County 
constituted a pre-loss release or waiver of the subrogation 
rights of Safeco. 
B. Statement of Facts 
In 1978, Copper Mountain Mental Health entered into a 
lease agreement with the Partnership, then owners of the 
building. At that time, Copper Mountain Mental Health was one 
of several distinct mental health programs operated by Salt 
Lake County. In 1981, all divisions were consolidated as the 
Salt Lake County Mental Health Program. (Clerk's Record Index 
["CR"] 3710, 4467 at pp. 6-8.) In the spring of 1981, Doug 
Kettle was director of administrative services for Salt Lake 
Mental Health and Jon Gilbert was assistant director of 
administrative services. (CR 3710, 4467 at pp. 10-11.) 
In the spring of 1981, Kettle and Gilbert entered 
into negotiations with the Partnership concerning the renewal 
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of the existing lease. Dr. Anderson and Dr. Packer represented 
the Partnership . n tne :eisf: negotiations, (CR 3997
 f 40?' . 
A t the " ,-.>-Qrj.x..• . • . 
1 9 8 1 , L . ,_ a o r i i . . . .».•_; :. .. .. -<_..:;_: experience tnat 
i t was important t: re : : "; : -al estate contract because It 
reflected the agreement between t^e parties, an.: if he d i d not 
a :j:i::ee 'w :iii t: ' * on i 1 I i IC t 
sign it tor ore ..^  - ..angea. , ^  
,
f
 undisputed * :at the artnershir: Id not employ 
thfi servi "^? ~f " " attcrne^T v t.ate aa^nt when 
i. enegot 11 
rather, relied entirely uj-on its *n ..igmen* 3 J . J. , 
App. Exhl^:* 
?n- ,,,i^-. „^ :c C^./^. ^... -. /c .sions .:d ;.case, Dr. 
Anderson has testified .13 ic LicT,;r: 
1
 In Salt Lake County , s S tatemei iu ui r'duu^  _LU
 A t_^  - ;; .. ... n 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment are excerpts i*. ...m the 
trial transcript of Fashion Place Investors and P.M. Properties v. 
Salt Lake County Mental Health, Case No. C84-1411 (Third District, 
Utah, October 14, 1986), a reformation action tried before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. The reformation action was brought 
by Fashion Place Investors against Salt Lake County in an attempt 
to reform that portion of paragraph 9 of the 19 81 Lease Agreement 
that requires the building owners to provide fire insurance on 
personal property of Salt Lake County. To the extent that 
testimony from that trial was cited or quoted verbatim in Salt Lake 
County's Statement of Facts, those pages of the trial transcript 
will be attached in Exhibit "A" to the Appendix to this Brief. 
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Anyway, it [the 1981 Lease Agreement] 
was made available to you, and you had 
an opportunity to read it? 
Yes. 
But you chose to read only the 
portions on the remodeling, the square 
footage and the rental; is that what 
you are saying? 
Yes. 
Doctor, have you had a chance to look— 
Choosing is kind of an interesting 
word there, but, yes, I perused it and 
paid particular attention to the areas 
that I thought were being changed. 
So are you saying that it's likely 
that you read the whole Lease, but 
concentrated just on those portions? 
Yes. Likely that I perused the whole 
thing, but concentrated on those areas 
that I thought were being changed. 
You realized, didn't you, in March of 
'81, that Salt Lake County was not 
acting as your representative or that 
of the Partnership, did you not? 
Surely. 
You realize that they were working at 
arm's length from you, right? 
Yes. 
And that they were working to get the 
best bargain that they could get from 
the partnership? 
Yes, and so were we. 
-5-
Q. But the only way you could find out if 
you were getting a good bargain was to 
read the Lease; wouldn't you agree? 
A. That is correct. 
(CR 3712-13, App. Exhibit "A.") 
Numerous maintenance, tax and insurance 
responsibilities were shifted to the Partnership/landlords 
under the new Lease. Responsibilities tor obtaining glass 
insurance for the Building and fire insurance on the personal 
property of the County were allocated to the Partnership under 
the 1981 Lease, as well as the responsibility for obtaining 
fire insurance on the Building. (CR 3713, 3750-56 [the 1981 
Lease in its entirety is attached as Exhibit "B" to the 
Appendix to this Brief].) 
In Doug Kettle's deposition, taken by 
plaintiff/appellant on July 14, 1987, he was asked directly by 
plaintiff's counsel why Salt Lake County Mental Health wanted 
the Partnership to provide fire insurance on the Building. He 
answered: 
The coverage. Probably two reasons. 
One, we didn't know what the policy covered 
that the County had. Two is that we had 
had experiences before, so when something 
had been taken, destroyed, they had a 
deductible on it and we ended up paying 
those out of our existing funds. 
(CR 3714, 4467 at p. 38.) 
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The Lease, as negotiated between Salt Lake County and 
the Partnership, provides in pertinent part: 
7. At the expiration of the term of the 
Lease, LESSEE will yield and deliver up the 
PREMISES to LESSOR in as good order and 
condition as when the same were entered 
upon by the LESSEE, responsible use and 
wear thereof, damage by fire and casualty 
not the fault of LESSEE and damage by 
elements excepted therefrom. 
* * * 
9. Responsibility for utilities, taxes and 
insurance shall be as indicated: 
Power (L), heat (L), water (L), sewer (L), 
telephone (T), real property tax (L), 
increase in real property tax (L), fire 
insurance on building (L), fire insurance 
on personal property (L), glass insurance 
(L). 
* * * 
14. If the demised PREMISES are completely 
destroyed by fire or other casualty, this 
Lease shall terminate on the day of such 
fire or casualty and no rental amount shall 
accrue or be paid by LESSEE on this Lease 
thereafter. In the event of partial 
destruction or damage so as to render the 
PREMISES totally or partially untentable, 
either party may terminate this Lease by 
giving written notice thereof to either 
party within fifteen days after said 
partial destruction or damage and no rental 
amount shall accrue or be paid by LESSEE on 
this Lease after the specified termination 
date. In the event of either of the 
foregoing terminations, LESSEE shall not be 
liable for damages of any kind because of 
such terminations. Upon termination, 
LESSEE shall relinquish possession of the 
PREMISES. 
-7-
* * * 
16.(a) LESSEE shall indemnify and save 
LESSOR harmless from all loss, damage, 
liability, or expense incurred by LESSOR 
due to the exclusive negligent acts or 
omissions to act of LESSEE, itps officers, 
employees, or agents arising tiut of 
LESSEE'S use or operation of the PREMISES 
and shall not permit any lien or other 
claim or demand to be enforced against the 
PREMISES by reason of the LESSEE'S use of 
the PREMISES. 
* * * 
19. The covenants and agreements contained 
in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the 
benefit of, and be binding uppn the parties 
hereto, their heirs, distributees, 
executors, administrators, lecjral 
representatives, assigns, and upon their 
respective successors-in-intetfest, except 
as otherwise expressly hereinbefore 
provided. 
(CR 3750-56, App. Exhibit f,B.ff) 
There is no provision in the lease that expressly 
reserves to the Partnership's insurer the right to subrogate 
against Salt Lake County. Indeed, it i$ clear from the 
deposition testimony of Dr. Anderson that a potential 
subrogation suit against tenants in the (building was not 
intended by him in any event: 
Q. Why don't you just tell me, roughly, 
off the top of your head. 
A. I don't know what an uncompensated 
damage is. You know, from the 
outset, I have been upset that I was 
even involved in a subrogation suit. 
These guys know that because I detest 
-8-
litigation. I just think maybe there 
is some other way to do it. But 
there's no better way, I guess. I 
was just—I thought, you know, I paid 
my premium to the insurance company 
and they pay me what benefits I 
contracted for and that would be the 
end of it. Over and above that, I 
had no idea to spend my heart, my soul 
and my stomach lining to relive it, so 
we did not. I don't know what damages 
are, and that's my point. 
(CR 3715) 
Patricia Marlowe, Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office, was the scrivener of the 1981 Lease. (CR 3715.) 
Paragraph 7 of the Lease is the "redelivery" provisions 
governing the return of the premises to the owner/landlord at 
the end of the Lease term. Ms. Marlowe was asked if 
paragraph 7 was entirely her choice of words, and she 
responded, "Paragraph 7, I think, is my choice in a sense and I 
think it's boilerplate." (CR 3716, 4492 at p. 70.) 
The following colloquy took place between counsel for 
Safeco and Ms. Marlowe concerning the import of paragraph 7: 
Q. You feel you understand the law of 
contracts reasonably well? 
A. Did I understand it in 1980? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Let's see. Relative to what? 
Q. To the drafter of a contract having 
any ambiguity construed against them. 
Do you understand that? 
-9-
A, Yes, I understand that. I also 
understand that at the time I drafted 
this Lease Agreement, that the intent 
was to make the landlord responsible 
for all insurance on the building and 
personal property. And that paragraph 
7, that—I mean, that's 
boilerplate. It has nothing to do 
with what I was told werQ the terms 
and conditions of this agreement. 
Q. What exactly were you told were the 
terms and conditions relative to 
insurance? That just on$ party would 
acquire it? 
A. That the landlord was going to take 
care of all of it, that the Lease 
checklist provides responsibility for 
the building and personal property on 
the landlord. I believe I had 
discussions with Nielson and maybe 
Mental Health that I checked to see 
that the assignments for landlord and 
tenant were accurate as on that 
checklist, and that was, in fact, what 
had been agreed by the parties. 
(CR 3716-17, CR 4492 at pp. 72-73.) 
When Ms. Marlowe was asked as to the interaction or 
effect of paragraph 16, the mutual indemnification provisions 
in the Lease Agreement, with paragraph 9, the insuring 
provisions, she stated: "That's fairly standard boilerplate, 
and it just deals with the issue of injury to third parties. 
It has nothing to do with injuries to property or casualty." 
Q. So in your opinion, 16A cjoes not have 
anything to do with— 
A. The fire loss? 
Q. Fire losses. 
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A. No, that's fairly standard in a lot of 
our contracts that we're talking about 
injury to third parties. 
(CR 3717-18, CR 4492 at pp. 51-52.) 
The actual negotiator of the Lease, Doug Kettle, 
also did not intend that any of the other provisions of the 
Lease should in any way contradict the benefits that the County 
received under paragraph 9. (CR 3718, CR 4467 at p. 56.) 
The subrogation section of Safeco's procedures manual 
states: "If the insured releases the wrongdoer from liability 
before the claim is paid by the company, he may extinguish the 
company's right of subrogation." (CR 373 0.) Further, the 
Safeco policy obtained by the Partnership expressly provides 
that its own insured can release others, in writing, from 
liability for loss prior to such loss, for property while on 
the premises. Execution of such a release does not affect the 
rights of the Partnership to recover from Safeco under the 
policy, and no notice requirement to Safeco is required when 
the Partnership releases a third party. (CR 3730, 3766.) 
It was also the testimony of Jack Bender, an 
underwriter for Safeco, that Safeco does not increase the 
premium charged for a policy when an insured waives the 
company's subrogation rights by written agreement and no 
increase in premium would have been charged for adding the 
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County as an additional insured under the Safeco policy. (CR 
3730-31, CR 4491 at pp. 77 and 101.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Granting of Summary Judgment was Proper and There are no 
Material Issues of Fact in Dispute. 
The issue before Judge Young 6n Salt Lake County's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment was whether Salt Lake 
County and the Partnership had "expressly contracted" that Salt 
Lake County would assume liability for fire damage resulting 
from its own negligent acts. The burden was upon Safeco to 
establish the express reservation of its subrogation rights. 
After reviewing the deposition testimony, portions of the 
transcript of the prior reformation trial, the Lease and 
portions of the Safeco policy, Judge Yoiing concluded that the 
parties had not discussed that issue and no material issues of 
fact exist as to that issue. There is no testimony in the 
record that the parties ever negotiated reserving to Safeco the 
right to subrogate against Salt Lake County. 
Judge Billings had determined in her earlier 
Memorandum Decision that a presumption exists that Salt Lake 
County is a coinsured of Safeco's, barring any subrogation 
action unless the parties "expressly contracted otherwise." 
Judge Billings, concerned about an apparent ambiguity in the 
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Lease between the redelivery and insurance clauses, was unable 
to grant summary judgment on that issue without further 
evidence. Other depositions were taken and the new evidence 
concerning the intent of the parties on the express reservation 
issue was presented to Judge Young. No material facts were 
brought forth that were in dispute on the issue of whether the 
parties "expressly contracted" that Safeco would have a 
subrogation right against Salt Lake County. 
Salt Lake County's pre-loss release argument was 
strictly an issue of law and no material issues of fact were in 
dispute concerning that legal theory. 
2. Judge Billings Incorrectly Applied the Alaska Insurance 
Case and Salt Lake County Should be Granted Summary Judgment as 
a Matter of Law. 
Given the law of the case within which Judge Young 
had to decide Salt Lake County's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, he arrived at the only just and sensible ruling. 
Notwithstanding, Salt Lake County contends, for purposes of 
this Appeal, that Judge Billings' original determination of the 
law of the case was in error in that the trial court failed to 
adopt in toto the reasoning of Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981), and to 
grant Salt Lake County summary judgment as a matter of law. 
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It is the position of Salt Lake County on appeal, 
that if there is no express lease provision which provides that 
a landlord's insurer has a right of subrogation against a 
tenant, then a landlord is presumed, as a matter of law, to 
carry fire insurance for the tenant's benefit, notwithstanding 
lease provisions whereby a tenant agreed not to negligently 
destroy any part of a premises and to yield them up at the end 
of the lease term in reasonably good condition. 
3. The Lease Agreement Constitutes a Pjre-Loss Release of 
Safecofs Subrogation Rights, 
Insureds can waive the subrogation rights of their 
insurers by entering into pre-loss release agreements. 
The Lease between Salt Lake County and the Building owners 
constitutes such a pre-loss release. Where landlords agree 
in a lease to provide fire insurance on the leased premises for 
the benefit of both parties, courts hav0 ruled that such an 
agreement is a complete defense to an action by the landlord, 
or by his/her insurer, against a tenant for negligence in 
causing a fire which damaged or destroyed the leased premises. 
The courts have made those determinations as a matter of law, 
without resorting to a determination as to whether the tenant 
is a coinsured under any insurance policy. 
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4. Safeco Cannot Subrogate Against Salt Lake County for any 
of its Insured Loss Arising out of the Fire, 
It is a general rule of law in Utah that an insurer 
cannot subrogate against a coinsured under a fire insurance 
policy in the absence of design or fraud. It is a specific 
rule of law in Utah that where it is determined that a landlord 
agrees to provide fire insurance for the benefit of a tenant, 
the landlord's insurer cannot subrogate against the tenant for 
damages to any part of the building or premises damaged by 
fire. When those rules of law are applied in conjunction with 
the numerous other cases which hold that an insurer cannot 
subrogate against its own insured, even on actions involving 
separate policies, Judge Young's dismissal of all of Safeco's 
subrogation claims arising out of the fires is proper and 
should be upheld by this Court. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THERE ARE NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT THAT 
PRECLUDED JUDGE YOUNG FROM GRANTING SALT 
LAKE COUNTY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE 
OF WHETHER THE PARTIES "EXPRESSLY CONTRACTED" 
IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT THAT SAFECO WOULD HAVE 
A RIGHT OF SUBROGATION AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Salt Lake County filed its first Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of its coinsured status under 
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Safeco's policies in December of 1986. Judge Billings denied 
the Motion and issued a Memorandum Opinion. (Memorandum 
Opinion is attached in full as Exhibit "C" to the Appendix of 
this Brief.) In the Memorandum Opinion^ Judge Billings 
established the law of the case for purposes of Salt Lake 
County's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Judge Billings begins her discussion of the 
applicable law by noting that the Utah Supreme Court expressly 
acknowledged that "where an insurance company attempts to 
recover, as a subrogee, from a coinsured under a fire 
insurance policy, the action must fail Xn the absence of design 
or fraud on the part of the coinsured." Board of Education 
v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1977). The trial court 
then went on to state the standard of law to be applied in the 
case at bar: "In cases where a landlord is obligated to 
provide fire insurance on a leased premises, the landlord is 
presumed to carry insurance for the tenant's benefit, and thus 
the tenant is presumed to be a coinsured, in the absence of 
an express agreement to the contrary." (CR 3738, App. 
Exhibit "C") 
Judge Billings also noted that in this case, "it is 
clear that the plaintiff/landlord assumed an obligation to 
provide fire insurance for both the leased premises and the 
personal property of Salt Lake County." (CR 3 739, App. 
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Exhibit "C" at p. 5.) Accordingly, Salt Lake County is 
"presumed a coinsured, thus barring any action by means of 
subrogation on the part of the insurer, unless the parties 
expressly contracted otherwise." Id. 
Judge Billings, concerned about an apparent ambiguity 
in the Lease between paragraph 7, the "redelivery" provision 
and paragraph 9, the "insurance" provision, stated in the 
Memorandum Opinion that the "pivotal question, therefore, is 
whether defendant, Salt Lake County, and plaintiff, owners of 
the Fashion Place Professional Building, expressly contracted 
that Salt Lake County would assume liability for its fire 
damage resulting from its own negligent acts." (CR 3739.) 
The legal framework within which Judge Young 
addressed Salt Lake County's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. The current owners, taking an assignment of 
the Lease from the Partnership, assumed an obligation to 
provide fire insurance for both the Building and the personal 
property of Salt Lake County. 
2. There is a presumption that Salt Lake County 
is a coinsured of Safeco's, barring any subrogation action, 
unless the parties "expressly contracted otherwise." 
3. The provisions of the Lease are ambiguous as 
to whether there was an express agreement that Salt Lake County 
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would be subject to a subrogation action, and, therefore, 
extrinsic evidence as to the parties1 intention on that issue 
must be considered. 
The testimony and facts brought before Judge Young at 
the time of the Second Motion for Summary Judgment clearly 
established that it was the intent of Sfclt Lake County to shift 
the burden of loss in the case of fire to the 
Partnership/lessorfs insurance company. It was both the intent 
and understanding of Salt Lake County that the fire insurance 
on the building and on its own personal property would be 
provided by the Partnership for the County's benefit. 
As noted in footnote 1 above, prior to the filing of 
the First Motion for Summary Judgment, [the current owner had 
brought a reformation action against Salt Lake County 
concerning the very Lease at issue in this case. The 
reformation action was an attempt by the current owner to argue 
that the provision requiring the current owner to provide fire 
insurance on the personal property of Salt Lake County was a 
mere "scrivener's error." The reformation action was tried 
before Judge Frederick in the Third District Court. 
The building owners called Dr. Anderson to testify 
concerning the negotiations of the 1981 Lease, and Salt Lake 
County called Doug Kettle and Jon Gilbert. Judge Frederick 
listened to the testimony of Dr. Anderson, Mr. Kettle and 
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Mr. Gilbert and denied plaintiffs1 claim for reformation of the 
Lease. Judge Frederick ruled in pertinent part: 
The evidence clearly indicates to this 
Court's satisfaction that Salt Lake County 
did not commit a mistake in its preparation 
of the agreement. It was the defendant 
Salt Lake County's intent to shift the 
personal property insurance obligation, 
among others, to the landlord. 
•k k k 
The defendant sought to drive a hard 
bargain and was aware of plaintiff's need 
to be flexible in the Lease terms due to 
substantial vacancies. The defendant, 
through its agents, recalled specific 
discussions regarding changes in the latter 
lease and went through the draft of the 
lease agreements page by page with the 
plaintiff's agents with no objections being 
voiced. To the contrary, the plaintiff's 
agent, witness, merely testified that he 
"understood" the insurance obligation was 
unchanged; that he perused the agreement, 
but paid little or no attention to details 
other than the rental rate and the expanded 
space demands. 
Negotiating agents for the County 
specifically sought, due to unsatisfactory 
terms of the '78 lease and previous 
insurance, distasteful insurance expenses, 
to shift all maintenance, utilities, 
responsibility to the landlord, which they 
did, except for the telephone, and went 
over the changes thoroughly with the 
landlord before the final document was 
executed. 
(CR 3724-25, 3763-65, App. Exhibit "A.") 
It is apparent from the findings of Judge Frederick 
that the plaintiffs never negotiated nor expressly contracted 
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to impose upon Salt Lake County responsibility for fire loss 
negligently caused when they renegotiated the Lease in 1981. 
Indeed, it was that Court's determination that the plaintiffs 
merely "perused the agreement but paid little or no attention 
to details other than the rental rate a^ id the expanded space 
demands." Such a finding collaterally estopps appellants 
from arguing otherwise at this late date. See Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch/ 86 Utah Adv. 
Rpts. 29, 30 (Utah App. 1988); Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 
246, 247-48 (Utah App. 1987). 
Of even more importance is the fact that nowhere in 
the Lease is there an express provision reserving to Safeco the 
right to subrogate against Salt Lake County. That fact is 
consistent with Dr. Anderson's own testimony that, "I thought, 
you know, I paid my premium to the insurance company and they 
pay me what benefits I contracted for, and that would be the 
end of it." (CR 3715). That testimony is no statement of an 
intent that a subrogation right be expressly reserved to Safeco 
to pursue a claim against Salt Lake County for fire loss 
negligently caused by the County. It is just the contrary. 
The foregoing evidence of intent, however, was not 
the only testimony Judge Young had to consider for purposes of 
Salt Lake County's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. There 
was also the testimony of the scrivener of the Lease, Patricia 
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Marlowe, and the deposition testimony of Doug Kettle. Ms. 
Marlowe testified that the language of paragraph 7, the 
redelivery provision, was general boilerplate language and 
was not intended to relate to or interact with the specific 
allocation of insurance responsibilities in paragraph 9. 
Doug Kettle, a negotiator of the Lease for Salt Lake County, 
also testified that he did not intend that any of the other 
provisions of the Lease should in any way contradict the 
insurance benefits that the County was to receive under 
paragraph 9. 
Therefore, further testimony indicated that it was 
the intent of the negotiating parties that paragraph 7 was 
general "boilerplate" language and paragraph 9 embodied the 
specific intentions of the parties. Standard rules of 
construction provide that in such situations, the specific 
portions of the Lease should prevail over the general 
portions. As is authoritatively discussed in 3 Corbin on 
Contracts, § 547, pp. 176-178, the specific prevails over the 
general. 
If the apparent inconsistency is between a 
clause that is general and broadly 
inclusive in character and one that is more 
limited and specific in its coverage, the 
latter should generally be held to operate 
as a modification and pro tanto 
nullification of the former. When parties 
are dealing with particulars, with a few 
objects, describing them specifically and 
individually, they are more likely to know 
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what they are talking about and to say what 
they mean. The concrete is more readily 
understandable than the abstract and more 
likely to be accurately expressed. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
See also Restatement, Contract § 236(c)("where there is 
an inconsistency between general provisions and specific 
provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the 
meaning of the general provisions.11) Applying this rule of 
construction, all of the provisions of the Lease can be read in 
harmony by interpreting Paragraph 7 to apply only to uninsured 
loss. 
When a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law on undisputed material facts, the granting of a summary 
judgment cannot be defeated because there are evidentiary 
conflicts as to other factual issues. Wheeler v. Mann, 86 
Utah Adv. Rpt. 3 (Utah 1988). 
Appellants rely upon the affidavits of Dr. Anderson 
and Dr. Packer to raise material issues of fact in an attempt 
to preclude this Court from affirming Judge Young's granting of 
summary judgment. Salt Lake County urges this Court to 
carefully review those affidavits. (Affidavit of Robert H. 
Anderson, CR 3995-98, Affidavit of Barlow L. Packer, CR 
4001-05.) Nowhere in the affidavits does it say that either 
Anderson or Packer expressly discussed or stated in any fashion 
that Safeco was to retain a right of subrogation against Salt 
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Lake County. A silent understanding or unexpressed intention 
is not sufficient to raise an issue of material fact, Cf. 
Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 
1983) (it is well established in the law that unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract). 
Praggastis v. Sandners, 40 Or. App. 477, 595 P.2d 520, 
524 (1979) (law is not concerned with parties1 undisclosed 
intents and ideas). 
Once provisions are placed in the Lease imposing upon 
the lessor the duty to obtain fire insurance on the Building, 
the presumption is Salt Lake County is a coinsured. The 
appellants have the burden to come forward with material facts 
that show they "expressly contracted otherwise." There may be 
some dispute as to what the unstated or subjective intent of 
Dr. Packer was, but an affidavit which does no more than 
reflect the affiant's opinion and conclusions does not create a 
material issue of fact that precluded Judge Young from granting 
summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake County. See Webster 
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). See also, 
Cascade Trailer Court v. Beeson, 50 Wash. App. 678, 748 
P.2d 761 (Wash. App. 1988) (affirming summary judgment in face 
of conflicting affidavits, where affidavits did not go to issue 
of "express agreement" to limit benefits of fire insurance); 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985) (affidavit 
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which merely reflects affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and 
which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to 
create issue of fact to preclude summary judgment). 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SALT LAKE COUNTY'S 
FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT SALT LAKE 
COUNTY IS A COINSURED UNDER SAFECO'S POLICY 
PRECLUDING SUBROGATION 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in ruling 
that, absent an express provision in t}ie Lease to the 
contrary, the lessee is presumed to bei a coinsured of the 
lessor, thus barring the subrogation aption by the lessor's 
insurer. Most of the cases relied upojn by appellants address 
indemnification agreements and do not address the issues on 
appeal in this case.2 
It is Salt Lake County's position that the better 
reasoned rule of law is: Absent a provision in the lease 
expressly reserving to the landlord's(insurer the right to 
subrogate against a tenant, a tenant .^s presumed to be a 
coinsured of the landlord. Judge Billings erred in Salt Lake 
2
 Two Utah cases not cited by appellants, Board of Education 
v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1977), &nd Bonneville on the Hill 
Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 402 (Utah 1977), are germane to this 
appeal and will be discussed infra. 
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County's First Motion for Summary Judgment by not ruling as a 
matter of law that Salt Lake County is a coinsured of 
Safeco's and Safeco is precluded from subrogating against Salt 
Lake County. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter 
of law rather than fact, this Court is free to reappraise the 
trial court's legal conclusions. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. 
Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). 
As noted by Judge Billings in her Memorandum 
Decision, the facts of Alaska Ins, Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981), presents 
the "most analogous case to the one presently before this 
court." (CR 3740, App. Exhibit "C") Notwithstanding that 
determination, Judge Billings refused to follow the holding of 
the court in Alaska Insurance, (CR 3743, App. Exhibit "C" 
at p. 9.) It is respondent's position that Trial Judge 
Billings' refusal to embrace in toto the holding and 
reasoning of Alaska Insurance is error. 
In Alaska Insurance, the issue considered by the 
Alaska Supreme Court was whether a commercial tenant (RCA) was 
an "implied coinsured" under its landlord's fire insurance 
policy, when a provision in the lease required the landlord to 
obtain and keep in effect, an insurance policy on the leased 
premises, covering loss because of fire. 623 P.2d at 1217. 
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The court first observed that it is a well-established rule 
that an insurer cannot recover by means of subrogation against 
its own insured, and to permit the insurer to sue its own 
insured for a liability covered by the insurance policy would 
violate basic equity principles, as well as sound public 
policy. Id. at 1217-18. The Alaska Supreme Court went on to 
state that if it found that the tenant in the case could be 
considered a coinsured of the landlord, the insurer could not 
exercise a right of subrogation against the tenant. 
The lease at issue in Alaska insurance contained a 
clause that the building would be returried in good condition, 
excepting those damages arising from the direct negligence on 
the part of the lessee to any portion of the building 
(redelivery provision). The lease also contained an 
indemnification agreement whereby the lessee agreed to 
indemnify and hold the lessor harmless from and against loss, 
damage and liability arising from the negligent acts of the 
lessee. Id. at 1218. Virtually identical provisions are 
found in the Lease at issue in this case. 
The lease agreement in Alaska Insurance also 
contained a provision that the landlord would obtain and keep 
in force a policy of insurance to cover loss by fire (Paragraph 
IIIc.) Id. at 1219. After examining the terms of the 
lease agreement, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the 
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question was whether to give primacy to the redelivery and 
indemnity covenants of the lease, or to the insuring clause 
wherein the lessor promised to obtain insurance covering, among 
other things, damage to the leased premises caused by fire. 
The court held: 
In our view, the redelivery and indemnity 
provisions relied upon by AIC, when read 
in conjunction with the insurance clause of 
IIIc, fail to clearly establish RCA's 
liability for fire damage caused by its own 
negligence. 
Id. at 1219. 
The court reasoned that it would be undesirable as a 
matter of public policy to permit the risk of loss from a fire 
negligently caused by a tenant to fall upon the tenant rather 
than the landlord's insurer. One policy consideration cited by 
the Alaska Supreme Court was the reduction of litigation. If a 
landlord's casualty insurer may seek to recoup its payments for 
fire loss by alleging the negligence of the tenant, many 
commercial fire losses will result, in the opinion of the 
court, in costly litigation. Jd. n. 3. 
The court went on to hold that if a landlord in the 
commercial lease covenants to maintain fire insurance on the 
leased premises, and the lease does not otherwise clearly 
establish the tenant's liability for fire loss caused by its 
own negligence by expressly reserving to the landlord's 
insurer the right to subrogate against the tenant, the tenant 
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is, for the limited purposes of defeating the insurer's 
subrogation claim, an implied coinsured of its landlord. 
Id. at 1220. 
Other courts faced with situations similar to the 
case at bar, have agreed wholeheartedly with the Alaska Supreme 
Court in holding that an insurer of a landlord may not 
subrogate against the tenant. In Cascade Trailer Court v. 
Beeson, 50 Wash. App. 678, 748 P.2d 761 (Wash. App. 1988), 
Cascade Trailer Court had rented a single-family dwelling to 
three tenants. The trailer burned down as a result of the 
negligence of one of the tenants and Cascade's insurers brought 
a subrogation action. Cascade asserted that in the lease 
agreement, the tenants had agreed to "not intentionally nor 
negligently destroy any part of the premises," or in the 
alternative, that the tenants had orall^ promised they would 
not negligently damage the premises. The trial court dismissed 
the insurer's subrogation claims and the Washington Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
The court in its analysis grouped the cases on this 
subject into those: (1) holding the landlord's insurance is 
presumed to be held for the tenant's benefit as a coinsured 
in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, and (2) 
those holding the tenant liable in a subrogation action in the 
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absence of an express agreement to the contrary. The 
Washington court rejected the second line of cases. 
The appellate court went on to note that an issue of 
fact was created by the affidavits of one tenant and the 
apartment manager which contradicted each other on whether a 
written lease was executed. But the court dismissed the 
disputed affidavits because they did not go to the issue of 
whether there was an "express agreement" by the parties to 
limit the benefit of fire insurance to the landlord. 749 P.2d 
at 766. 
The court cited Alaska Insurance as being "closer 
to what we have here." After reviewing Alaska Insurance, the 
Washington appellate court held as follows: 
We hold that the fact that the disputed 
Lease provided the tenants would not 
negligently destroy the premises does not 
indicate the parties intended to limit the 
benefit of the insurance to the landlord. 
A tenant could sign the written Lease at 
issue and reasonably never contemplate that 
if the premises were destroyed by a fire he 
negligently caused, his landlord's insurer 
could collect damages from him. We adopt 
the reasonable expectations rationale of 
the Sutton line of cases and hold 
Cascade is presumed to carry its insurance 
for the tenants1 benefit because the Lease 
did not contain an express provision to the 
contrary. Although the Rizzuto-Millican-
Payne decisions of the Washington courts 
did not need to go this far in reaching 
their holdings, their general analysis 
supports a holding here that focuses on the 
parties f expectations. 
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749 P.2d at 766, 
In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Norlin Indus., 
Inc., 428 So.2d 325, 326 (Fla. App. 1983), the court held 
that where a lease agreement provided that the lessor agreed to 
maintain fire insurance on the building, the obvious intent of 
the parties was to shift the risk of damages caused by fire to 
an insurer. The court reasoned that the indemnification 
agreement from lessee to lessor did not defeat that intent, but 
merely constituted an "additional protection for the lessor 
that would apply in certain circumstances not at issue" before 
the court and upheld the trial court's dismissal of the 
insurance company's subrogation suit against the lessee. Id. 
at 32 6. The vast majority of cases on t^ his issue in the last 
twenty years are in accord. 
In the case at bar, the Lease provides that the 
owners/lessors are to provide both fire insurance for the 
building and fire insurance for the personal property of Salt 
Lake County. There is no express provision in the Lease that 
states the lessors' insurer retains a right of subrogation 
against Salt Lake County. Under the reasoning of Alaska 
Insurance, Cascade Trailer Court, and N6rlin Industries, 
the language in paragraphs 7 (redelivery provision) and 
paragraph 16 (indemnity provision) are insufficient as a matter 
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of law to expressly reserve a right of subrogation to Safeco 
Insurance Company. 
The holding of the Alaska Supreme Court in Alaska 
Insurance, represents the better-reasoned rule of law. See 
also West America Ins. Co. v. Pic Way Shoes, 110 Mich. 
App. 684, 313 N.W. 2d 187, 188-89 (1981) (lessor of commercial 
property agreed to provide fire insurance for benefit of both 
lessor and lessee, and lessee was thereby relieved of liability 
for fire damage occasioned by its own negligence? trial court 
was correct in granting summary judgment for lessee). In 
arriving at its conclusion that a tenant is a coinsured of the 
landlord absent an express reservation of the landlord's 
insurer's subrogation rights the Alaska Supreme Court relied on 
numerous authorities. See Alaska Insurance, 623 P.2d at 
1218, n. 1. The court noted that "the trend has been to find 
that the insurance obtained was for the mutual benefit of both 
parties, and that the tenant 'stands in the shoes of the 
insured landlord for the limited purpose of defeating a 
subrogation claim.'" Id. at 1218 (citing Rizzuto v. 
Morris, 22 Wash. App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979). See 
also McGinnis v. LaShelle, 519 N.E.2d 699, 701-02 (111. 
App. 1988) (tenant considered coinsured of landlord absent 
express agreement to the contrary). 
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The rationale of the cases discussed above is 
entirely consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of 
an insurer's subrogation rights as set fforth in Board of 
Education v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1977). In 
Hales, the school board contracted for ponstruction of a 
new high school and obtained a builder's risk insurance 
policy. The policy covered the value of the materials and 
property on-site during construction and insured the interests 
of the school board, the general contraptor (by specific name), 
and "subcontractors." 
A fire broke out after construction had commenced, 
resulting in substantial property damage. The school board's 
insurance carrier paid the loss and brought a subrogation 
action against a subcontractor. The insurance company argued 
that since the builder's risk policy injured the loss of 
"property" only and did not cover liability, it could subrogate 
against the subcontractor. 566 P.2d at 1247. 
The trial court rejected the insurance company's 
attempted distinction between liability and property insured 
and granted summary judgment to defendants on the issue that an 
insurer may not maintain a subrogation ^ction against a 
coinsured. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. The high court 
noted that other courts consistently have held that where an 
insurer attempts to recover from a coinsured covered under a 
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fire insurance policy, the action must fail in the absence of 
design or fraud on the part of the coinsured. "Fire loss is 
nearly always caused by negligence.11 Id. at 1247. The court 
specifically adopted the reasoning that an insurer, which has 
accepted premiums covering the entire property, has assumed the 
risk of negligence of each insured party. The insurer cannot 
shift the risk to any one of the coinsureds. Id. at 1248. 
Salt Lake County is a coinsured under the Safeco 
policy. All subrogation claims against Salt Lake County, of 
whatever nature, arising out of the fire, are barred. This 
lawsuit should never have been filed. 
Ill 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A PRE-LOSS WAIVER 
OR RELEASE OF SAFECO'S SUBROGATION RIGHTS 
In its Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Salt Lake 
County raised a new legal theory not argued in its First 
Motion for Summary Judgment: That the Partnership released 
Salt Lake County from any possibility of a subrogation action 
by agreeing in the Lease to provide fire insurance on the 
building and Salt Lake County's personal property. It is 
undisputed that appellants assumed an obligation to provide 
fire insurance for both the Building and the personal property 
of Salt Lake County. (CR 373 9.) It is Salt Lake County's 
contention that such a contractual obligation in conjunction 
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with other provisions of the Lease, is a complete defense to 
Safeco's claims against Salt Lake County, whether Salt Lake 
County is a coinsured or not. 
In Koennecke v. Waxwing Cedar Prod,, Ltd,, 273 
Or, 639, 543 P.2d 669 (1975), plaintiff/lessor brought an 
action to recover damages for the destruction of real property 
improvements and equipment resulting from a fire caused by the 
alleged negligence of defendant/lessee, Waxwing Cedar 
Products. Waxwing filed an affirmative defense praying for 
reformation of its lease with the plaintiff, covering the real 
property and equipment. 
The original lease between the parties provided only 
that the plaintiff "shall maintain full I insurance coverage 
protecting said equipment against loss by fire and other 
insurable hazards." After hearing the evidence, the trial 
court reformed the lease to provide "Sunset [plaintiff] shall 
maintain full insurance coverage for the benefit of Waxwing & 
Sunset in protecting said leased property against loss by fire 
and other insurable hazards." 543 P.2d at 670. The trial 
court also found that the lease, as reformed, constituted a 
complete defense in favor of the defendant as to the 
plaintiff's claim for property damage. Id. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that even though 
the lease had been reformed to provide that the plaintiff 
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should maintain insurance coverage for the benefit of both 
parties, nevertheless he was entitled to recover from 
defendants because the court should not construe an agreement 
to immunize a party from liability for his own negligence in 
the absence of an unequivocal agreement to that effect and that 
the reformed lease was equivocal. Citing from Waterway 
Terminals v. P.S. Lord, 242 Ore. 1, 406 P.2d 556, 565 (1965), 
the court stated: 
In several recent cases, the courts have 
held that an agreement of the parties to a 
lease obligating the landlord to carry 
insurance on the leased premises is a 
complete defense to an action by the 
landlord, or by his insurer as subrogee, 
against the tenant for negligence in 
causing a fire which damaged or destroyed 
the leased premises. (Citations omitted.) 
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the fire insurance 
clause constituted a complete defense to plaintiff's claim for 
property damage. 543 P.2d at 672. 
Koennecke is analytically on all fours with the 
case at bar. The lease agreement as reformed in Koennecke 
contained requirements that the landlord would carry insurance 
and that the insurance would inure to the benefit of the 
lessee. Paragraph 9 of the Lease in this case provides that 
the landlords will obtain fire insurance on the building and 
paragraph 19 provides that the provisions of the Lease inure to 
the benefit of both parties. Therefore, the obligation to 
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provide fire insurance on the building is for the benefit of 
Salt Lake County, Under the reasoning of the court in 
Koennecke, such an agreement presents a complete defense to 
an action by Safeco against Salt Lake County for alleged 
negligence in causing a fire which damaged or destroyed the 
premises. 
Furthermore, Paragraph 14 of the Lease provides that 
in the event of either partial or complete destruction of 
Building, "LESSEE shall not be responsible for damages of any 
kind because of such terminations." (CR 3753-54 (emphasis 
added). Paragraphs 9, 14, and 19, when read together, clearly 
releases any subrogation claim for fire loss that Safeco may 
have possessed. (CR 4494 at pp. 33-34.)! 
In Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Const. 
Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977), Liberty 
Mutual, proceeding as a supposed subrogee of its insured, 
brought suit against the lessee, whose negligence was 
responsible for damage to a "scraper" leased from the insured, 
and to recover an amount equal to what had been paid to the 
insured in fulfillment of the casualty Coverage. After the 
insured, Conexco, filed a Complaint in intervention to block 
the subrogation effort on the theory thit it had contracted 
away its rights to recover from the lessee for any damage to 
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the scraper, Liberty Mutual filed a Cross-Complaint to recoup 
the money paid to Conexco. 
After the lessee, Altfillisch, had leased the 
equipment from Conexco, and informed Conexco that it was 
having difficulty obtaining insurance, Conexco had assured 
Altfillisch that arrangements had been made to cover the 
equipment in question with insurance. (In fact, no such 
arrangements were ever made.) 13 9 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The 
California Court of Appeals held that the insurance company 
would be entitled to recover back from Conexco, not from 
Altfillisch, the proceeds it had paid out under the policy. 
In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court noted the 
following findings were not challenged: 
1. That said oral agreement by Conexco 
to furnish insurance to Altfillisch 
precluded any . . . action on behalf 
of Conexco as against Altfillisch 
for . . . damage to said Terex 
scraper by Altfillisch. 
2. That said oral agreement by Conexco 
to furnish insurance to Altfillisch 
precluded any . . . rights of 
subrogation on behalf of Liberty . . . 
against Altfillish for any . . . 
damage to said Terex scraper. 
139 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. 
It was undisputed by the trial court, the appellate 
court, and the parties that the pre-loss agreement by the 
lessor to provide insurance to the lessee was a complete 
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defense to claims by the lessor or the lessor's insurance 
company as a subrogee. The rule as stated in the above cases, 
applies with full force and vigor to the claims of plaintiffs 
and Safeco insurance in this case. Indeed, Safecofs own 
internal documents and policies of insurance recognize this 
rule of law. The subrogation section of Safeco's procedures 
manual states: "If the insured releases the wrongdoer from 
liability before the claim is paid by the company, he may 
extinguish the company's right of subrogation." Paragraph 
51.015 at p. 5103. (CR 3730.) 
Additionally, the Safeco insurance policy obtained by 
the Partnership expressly provides that its own insured can 
release others, in writing, from liability for loss prior to 
such loss for property while on the premises. Execution of 
such a release does not affect the rights of the Partnership to 
recover from Safeco under the policy, arid no notice requirement 
to Safeco is required when the Partnership releases a third 
party. (CR 3766.) Safeco also does not increase the premium 
charge for a policy when an insured waives the company's 
subrogation rights by written agreement and no increase in 
premium would have been charged for adding the County as an 
additional insured under the Safeco policy. (CR 3730-31, 
CR 4491 at p. 77, p. 101.) 
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Appellants seem unwilling to even recognize that a 
pre-loss agreement to provide insurance for the benefit of a 
lessee waives an insurer's subrogation rights and constitutes 
an absolute defense to a property damage claim. However, 
courts faced with similar factual situations to the case at bar 
have ruled that no subrogation rights exist. Koennecke v. 
Waxwing Cedar Prod., supra; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Altfillisch Const. Co., supra. See also, Extaza 
of 34th Street v. City Stores Co., 479 N.Y.S.2d 5, 467 
N.E.2d 889 (Ct. App. 1984) (tenant's insurer waived its rights 
to subrogation against landlord, to whom tenant, by entering 
into the lease had given prior written release); Insurance Co. 
of North America v. Universal Mort. Co., 82 Wis. 170, 262 
N.W.2d 92 (1978) (in denying insurer's claim for recoupment of 
payment made to insured, the court noted that it was "expressly 
agreed" that a pre-loss contractual liability waiver entered 
into between insurer and its landlord in a lease constituted a 
defense to any subrogation action). 
Koennecke stands for the proposition that a 
pre-loss promise to provide insurance for the benefit of a 
lessee constitutes, as a matter of law, a complete defense to 
any subrogation action from the landlord's insurer. Safeco's 
own manual recognized the fact that insureds could enter into 
such agreements that would destroy its subrogation rights. 
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Paragraphs 9, 14 and 19 of the Lease constitute a pre-loss 
agreement by Safeco's insureds to waive Safeco's subrogation 
rights. Such a waiver is a complete defense, irrespective of 
whether the Court determines that Salt Lake County is a 
coinsured under the Safeco policy. 
IV 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT ALL OF SAFECO•S 
SUBROGATION CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in 
dismissing all of Safeco's subrogation claims and assert 
that a coinsured is insured only to the extent of the 
interest and coverage agreed upon, and that an insurer can, 
therefore, subrogate for losses beyond the extent of the 
contractual agreement. Appellants rely upon the reasoning set 
forth in a line of cases beginning with Employers1 Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Behunin, 275 F. Supp. 399 (D. Colo. 1967), and 
culminating with Agra-By-Products, Inc. v. Agway, Inc., 
347 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 1984). (Appellants^ Brief, pp. 37-39.) 
The fundamental error of appellants1 argument lies in the fact 
that the Utah Supreme Court has rejected appellants1 position 
in two separate cases and that the majority of other 
jurisdictions have also rejected appellants1 contentions. 
In Board of Education v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246 
(Utah 1977), an insurance company attempted to subrogate 
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against one of its own, admitted coinsureds. The plaintiff 
in Hales argued that an insurer may recover amounts paid to 
insureds other than the defendant for property losses caused by 
the defendant's negligence in the fire, 566 P.2d at 1247. To 
support its position, the plaintiff relied upon the exact same 
line of cases as cited by the appellant in the case at bar. In 
response, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[W]e are not 
persuaded by their reasoning." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that nearly all 
fire loss is a result of someone's negligence and quoted with 
approval, the "dissenting" opinion in McBroome-Bennett 
Plumbing v. Villa France, 515 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App. 1974) (the 
majority opinion of which is relied upon by appellants) which 
states: 
The insurer, which has accepted one premium 
covering the entire property and has 
assumed the risk of the negligence of each 
insured party, ought not to be allowed to 
shift the risk to any one of them. 
566 P.2d at 1248. 
In Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 
P.2d 402 (Utah 1977), a landlord brought suit against a 
tenant's estate for damage to an adjoining apartment resulting 
from a fire in the tenant's apartment. The trial court entered 
summary judgment for the tenant's estate and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, after analyzing redelivery 
provisions different from the case at bar, found that the 
parties understood that the landlord was paying the fire 
insurance premiums on the entire premises. The court later 
went on to hold: 
It certainly would be discordant to common 
sense to suppose that the landlord insured 
only the deceased's apartment against loss 
by fire. The only logical view is that 
such insurance coverage would indemnify the 
landlord for damages to any part of its 
building or premises caused by fire, and 
that this is the reason for so exempting 
the tenants, 
572 P.2d at 404. 
The reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in Hales 
and Bonneville is consistent with other jurisdictions. In 
Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., Inc., 500 P.2d 945 
(Mont. 1972), an insurer sought to subrqgate against an 
allegedly negligent third-party subcontractor. The 
subcontractor, however, was also insured by Home under a 
separate policy. Notwithstanding that the insurer was seeking 
to enforce its subrogation rights on a separate policy, the 
Montana Supreme Court reasoned that no ifight of subrogation can 
arise in favor of an insurer against its own insured because 
"subrogation exists only with respect to rights of the insurer 
against third persons to whom the insurer owes no duty." The 
-42-
Montana Supreme Court quoted with approval the following 
statement from 2 Richards on Insurance, § 185: 
An insurer clearly may be subrogated to its 
insured's claim against a third party who 
tortiously causes the loss, but no 
subrogation exits against the insured or 
coinsured whose negligence caused the 
loss. 
500 P.2d at 949. 
See also, Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Gage Plumbing & 
Heating Co., 433 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1970); New 
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Homans-Kohler, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 
1017, 1020 (D.R.I. 1969); Stafford Metal Works, Inc. v. Cook 
Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp. 56, 61-63 (N.D. Tex. 1976); 
Baugh-Blarde Const. Co. v. College Util. Corp., 561 
P.2d 1211, 1214 (Alaska 1977). 
Judge Young was correct in dismissing all of Safeco's 
subrogation claims arising out of the fire and the court below 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, respondents 
respectfully request this Court to affirm in all aspects the 
summary judgment entered in respondents1 favor by the trial 
court. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
A WE DO. 
Q WHEN YOU SAY WE, WHO IS THE --
A MY WIFE AND I. 
Q DO YOU PREPARE THE LE^SE AGREEMENT THAT 
5 ! YOU GIVE TO THE TENANTS TO SIGNJ? 
6 I A NO. 
i 
7 | Q YOU DON'T USE A LEASE AGREEMENT AT ALL? 
i 
i 
8 | A WE USE A LEASE AGREEMENT, YES. 
9 Q WHO PREPARED THOSE? 
10 J A I HAVE. I HIRE A MANAGEMENT FIRM. 
M ' Q SO YOU HAVE THESE RENTAL UNITS IN A 
I 
12 ' PROPERTY MANAGEMENT? 
13 I A YES . 
I 
14 | Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU HAD THESE RENTAL UNITS? 
15 A DEPENDING UPON THIS OiNE, I HAVE GOT A 
16 COUPLE, OVER THE PAST FOUR OR FIVE OR SIX YEARS. 
17 
18 
19 
Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU HAD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
PEOPLE TAKING CARE OF THE RENTAJLS? 
A WITH A PERIOD OF -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
20 A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, PROBABLY MOST OF THE TIME 
21 j Q THEN HOW MANY HOMES HAVE YOU BOUGHT AMD 
j 
SOLD? 22 
23 A TWO. 
24 - Q NOW, YOU KNOW, DON'T YOU, FROM YOUR OWN 
25 PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THAT IT'S IMPORTANT TO READ 
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! J CONTRACTS, AND IN PARTICULAR, REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
A YES . 
Q WHY IS IT IMPORTANT, DOCTOR? 
A WELL, BECAUSE IT REFLECTS THE AGREEMENTS 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
6 Q IF YOU DON'T AGREE WITH SOMETHING THAT'S 
IN THE CONTRACT, THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, YOU DON'T 
SIGN IT BEFORE IT'S CHANGED; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q AND YOU KNEW THAT BEFORE MARCH, 1981; DID 
YOU NOT? 
A SURELY. 
Q HOW ABOUT INSURANCE, DOCTOR, WHAT 
BACKGROUND OR EXPERIENCE DO YOU HAVE IN INSURANCE? 
A VIRTUALLY WHAT EVERY CITIZEN HAS. 
16 j Q BUYING YOUR OWN --
A ACQUIRING INSURANCE, AND BUY YOUR OWN 
INSURANCE AND PAY THE PREMIUM. 
Q ON THE RENTAL UNITS THAT YOU HAVE HAD THE 
LAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS, YOU PROCURE THE INSURANCE ON 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 , THOSE U N I T S ? 
22 A YES . 
23 ' Q YOU DO THAT THROUGH AN AGENT? 
I 
24 j A YES . 
25 I Q WHAT'S THE NAME OF THE AGENT? 
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Q BUT ANYWAY, IT WENT BACK DOWN? 
A YES . 
Q NOW, IN DEALING WITH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
4 j MENTAL HEALTH IN MARCH OF '81 WHEN EXHIBIT 4 WAS 
5 i NEGOTIATED, YOU DID NOT EMPLOY THE SERVICES OF ANY 
6 PROPERTY MANAGER, DID YOU? 
7 ' A NO . 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Q YOU DID NOT EMPLOY THE SERVICES OF AN 
ATTORNEY, DID YOU? 
A NO. 
Q YCU DID NOT EMPLOY THE SERVICES OF A REAL 
ESTATE AGENT, DID YOU? 
A NO. 
Q YOU WERE RELYING ENTIRELY ON YOUR JUDGMENT 
15 AND DECISIONS WHEN NEGOTIATING THAT LEASE? 
16 
17 
18 
A YES. 
Q THAT'S RIGHT? 
A YES. ON THE EXTENSION OF OUR ORIGINAL 
19 ' L E A S E , YES 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q YOU DO REALIZE, DON'T YOU, THAT IT IS A 
REASONABLE AND PRUDENT THING TO DO IN REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS TO GO TO AN ATTORNEY WHO IS EXPERIENCED 
IN REAL ESTATE MATTERS? 
A YES . 
Q YOU ALSO REALIZE THAT IT'S REASONABLE AMD 
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1 I N O T I C E D OR NOT PAID P A R T I C U L A R A T T E N T I O N TO THE 
i 
2 , DETAILS OF THE LEASE . 
I 
3 Q SO IF YOU READ THE LEASE, YOU LOOK AT THE 
4 LEASE FOR THE SQUARE FOOTAGE ONLY, THE RENT AND THE 
5 | REMODELING, AND THEN YOU HAD TO HAVE THE LEASE WHEN 
6 YOU SIGNED IT? 
i 
7 A OR AT THE TIME I SIGNED IT. 
8 ' Q ANYWAY, IT WAS MADE A V A I L A B L E TO YOU, AND 
9 I YOU HAD AN O P P O R T U N I T Y TO READ IT? 
10 A YES . 
11 | Q BUT YOU CHOSE TO READ ONLY THE PORTIONS ON 
12 | THE REMODELING, THE SQUARE FOOTAGE, AND THE RENTAL; 
13 j IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE SAYING? 
14 ! A YES . 
15 • Q DOCTOR, HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK --
A CHOOSING IS KING OF AN INTERESTING WORD 
T H E R E , BUT, YES, I PERUSED IT AND PAID PARTICULAR 
16 
17 
18 , A T T E N T I O N TO THE AREAS THAT I THO U G H T WERE BEING 
i 
i 
19 ' CHANGED. 
20 Q SO ARE YOU SAYING THAT IT'S LIKELY THAT 
21 , YOU READ THE WHOLE LEASE BUT C O N C E N T R A T E D JUST ON 
22 T H O S E PORTIONS? 
23 A YES, LIKELY THAT I PERUSED THE WHOLE THING, 
I 
24 BUT C O N C E N T R A T E D ON THOSE AREAS THAT I THOUGHT WERE 
25 BEING C H A N G E D . 
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1 Q YOU R E A L I Z E D , DIDN'T YOU, IN MARCH OF '31 
2 , THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS NOT ACTING AS YOUR 
3 I REPRESENTATIVE OR THAT OF THE PARTNERSHIP; DID YOU 
4 I NOT? 
5 j A SURELY. 
6 Q YOU REALIZED THAT THEY WERE WORKING AT ARM'S 
7 LENGTH FROM YOU, RIGHT? 
A YES . 
Q AND THAT THEY WERE WORKING TO GET THE BEST 
BARGAIN THAT THEY COULD GET FROM THE PARTNERSHIP? 
A YES, AND SO WERE W E . 
Q BUT THE ONLY WAY YOU COULD FIND OUT IF YOU 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 ' WERE GETTING A GOOD BARGAIN WAS TO READ THE LEASE; 
14 ' WOULDN'T YOU AGREE? 
i 
15 I A THAT IS COR R E C T . 
I 
16 Q I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU COMPARE, DOCTOR --
17 ' BEFORE WE DO THAT, LET ME GO TO A COUPLE MORE T H I N G S . 
18 \ NOW, MR. BENNETT HAS ASKED YOU SEVERAL TIMES IN 
19 I SEVERAL DIFFERENT FORMS WHETHER OR NOT ANYBODY FROM 
20 SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH EVER CAME TO YOU AND 
21 TOLD YOU OR ASKED YOU WHERE THE INSURANCE WAS, RIGHT? 
22 | A YES. 
23 I Q DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION WHATSOEVER THAT 
24 SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH OR ANY OF ITS 
I 
25 EMPLOYEES KNEW PRIOR TO THE FIRE ON MAY 1, 1983, THAT 
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1 | SPACE? 
2 ; A YES . 
3 Q IN THE 1978 A G R E E M E N T , MR. KETTLE, WHEN 
4 ! YOU REVIEWED THAT, DID YOU REVIEW THE SECTIONS THAT 
5 . ARE ON PAGE 2, PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8? 
6 A Y E S . 
I 
7 , Q AS YOU REVIEWED THAT, DID YOU NOTE THE 
8 I RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN THE LANDLORDS AND THE 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
TENANTS? 
A YES . 
Q WERE YOU SATISFIED WITH THOSE DIVISIONS 
OF RESPONSIBILITIES? 
A WHAT WE DID IS WE USED THIS AS A --
MR. BENNETT: THE QUESTION WAS, WAS HE 
15 | SATISFIED? 
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION, IF THAT IS AN 
OBJECTION, IS SU S T A I N E D . 
THE W I T N E S S : N O . 
Q (BY MR. J O H N S O N ) WHY WEREN'T YOU SATISFIED 
20 WITH THOSE? 
21 A BECAUSE WE FELT THERE SHOULD BE SOME THAT 
22 , WAS THE LANDLORD'S RES PONSIBILITY . 
23 ] Q DID YOU HELP DRAFT THE NEW 1931 AGREEMENT? 
24 I A Y E S . 
25 Q DID YOU MAKE ANY CHANGES IN THE 1931 
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1 , A YES, WE DID. 
2 
3 
4 
i 
7 
Q WHAT WERE SOME OF THE CHANGES THAT YOU 
MADE IN THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES? 
A THE YARD SURFACING WAS ONE. 
5 j Q WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY DID THAT BECOME IN THE 
I 
6 i 1981 AGREEMENT? 
A WE MADE THE LESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT. 
Q OKAY. 
A ANOTHER ONE WAS THE LIGHT GLOBES AND TUBES. 
Q WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY pID THAT BECOME IN 
THE 1931 AGREEMENT? 
A THE LESSOR. 
13 | Q ALL RIGHT. 
i 
i 
14 i A AND THEN WE CHANGED THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
8 
9 
10 
i 
12 
15 TAX TO THE LESSOR. 
16 Q WERE THERE ANY OTHER AREAS OF MAINTENANCE 
17 I THAT WERE CHANGED BETWEEN THE TWO AGREEMENTS? 
I 
18 ,' A THE GLASS INSURANCE WAS ALSO CHANGED. 
19 Q WHAT PARAGRAPH IS GLASS INSURANCE IN? 
20 A IN THE OLD CONTRACT, WE HAD IT IN
 ( 
21 PARAGRAPH 7, NEW AGREEMENT, GLASS IS IN PARAGRAPH 8. 
22 IT'S JUST GLASS INSURANCE, AND UNDER THE NEW CONTRACT, ' 
i | 
23 WE JUST MADE THEM RESPONSIBLE If|l PARAGRAPH 9 FOR THE 
2 4 i GLASS INSURANCE . 
i 
25 Q WERE THERE ANY OTHER CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH 9 
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THAT WERE MADE CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE LANDLORD IN THIS CASE? 
A THE FIRE INSURANCE ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, 
4 I GLASS. THE ONLY THING THAT WAS LEFT WAS THE 
5 I TELEPHONES. 
6 Q THAT SOUNDS FAIR. DID YOU INTEND TO MAKE 
7 ' THOSE CHANGES IN THIS DOCUMENT? 
8 I A YES . 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Q AT THE TIME YOU RENEGOTIATED THE 1981 
LEASE WITH DR. ANDERSON AND THE OTHER DENTISTS AT 
THE FASHION PLACE BUILDING, DID YOU HAVE FACE-TO-FACE 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM? 
13 ' A YES, WE DID. 
14 ' Q HOW DID THOSE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED? WHAT 
15 HAPPENED? 
i 
16 A WELL, FIRST OF ALL, WE NEGOTIATED WITH 
I 
17 | DR. PACKER AND DR. ANDERSON, AND GENERALLY THEY WERE 
18 J ALWAYS THERE TOGETHER, EITHER ONE WOULD COME IN A 
19 LITTLE LATER THAN ANOTHER BECAUSE THEY WERE SEEING 
20 A PATIENT, BUT THEY WERE GENERALLY ALWAYS TOGETHER. 
2i THE MAJORITY OF THE MEETINGS THAT WE HAD BECAUSE WE 
22 HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WAS UP IN THEIR OFFICE, AND 
23 THE LAST FINAL DRAFT WAS DOWN IN OUR OFFICE. 
24 Q WHAT HAPPENED AT THAT MEETING WHERE YOU HAD 
25 THE LAST FINAL DRAFT? 
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A WHAT WE DID IS WE REVIEWED THE CONTRACT 
AND WENT THROUGH IT PAGE BY PAGE, AND THERE WAS FOUR 
OF US AT THAT PARTICULAR MEETING. THERE WAS 
DR. PACKER, DR. ANDERSON, MYSELF, AND JOHN GILBERT, 
AND BASICALLY WHAT WE DID IS REVIEWED IT SILENTLY 
AND JUST FLIPPED THROUGH IT PAG|E BY PAGE. 
Q WAS THERE AFJY DISCUSSION CONCERNING ANY OF 
THE CHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO LEASE AGREEMENTS? 
A NOT THAT I RECALL. 
Q NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE TO ANY OF THE 
CHANGES THAT YOU MADE? 
A NO OBJECTIONS. 
Q AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE MAY 1, 1933, FIRE, 
DID ANY OF THE DENTISTS WHO WERE IN THE PARTNERSHIP 
IN FASHION PLACE COME TO YOU ANlt> OBJECT TO ANY OF THE 
PROVISIONS IN THAT LEASE AGREEMENT? 
A NO. 
Q DID YOU PROVIDE A COPY| OF THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT TO DR. ANDERSON AT TH£ TIME OF THIS 
MEETING AT YOUR OFFICES? 
A YES. WE EACH HAD A COPY. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO WITH Y|0UR COPY AFTER THE 
MEETING? 
A THAT'S WHAT WE USED FOR THE DRAFT BEFORE 
WE SENT IT THROUGH FOR OUR FORMAIL SIGNATURE. 
63 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC 
n.\ i.xc n.wt.i pi u i >uh ~i: 
^ \ L I l .U.I l l l i 1 I \ | | i\\\\ 
1 I Q WERE THE TERMS THAT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT 
2 , HERE IN COURT, THE CHANGES THAT WERE MADE BETWEEN THE 
3
 : TWO LEASE AGREEMENTS, WERE THOSE IN THE DRAFT 
4 j AGREEMENT YOU GAVE TO DR. ANDERSON AT THAT MEETING? 
5 I A YES. 
6 Q HOW LONG DO YOU THINK IT WAS BEFORE THE 
7
 t FINAL CLEAN COPY CAME BACK OR FINAL COPY THAT GOES 
8 | TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE CAME BACK TO YOU FOR 
9 | DR . ANDERSON TO SIGN? 
10 A IT GENERALLY TAKES APPROXIMATELY THREE 
V ' WEEKS. 
12 Q WHEN THAT CAME BACK TO YOU, DID YOU PRESENT 
13 
14 
IT AGAIN TO DR. ANDERSON? 
A I'M NOT SURE IF WE PRESENTED IT OR 
15 DELIVERED IT UP FOR THEIR FINAL SIGNATURE 
16 Q BUT IN ANY EVENT, YOU SIGNED IT? 
17 I A YES . 
18 ! Q DID ANY OF THE DENTISTS IN THAT PARTNERSHIP 
19 I EVER TELL YOU, DR. ANDERSON OR PACKER OR WHOEVER IT 
20 WAS, TELL YOU THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE 
21 OR TO HONOR THE PROVISIONS IN PARAGRAPH 9 TO PROVIDE 
22 I YOU WITH FIRE INSURANCE FOR YOUR PERSONAL PROPERTY? 
23 } A NO. 
I 
24 ' Q WAS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU DID 
I 
25 ' HAVE FIRE INSURANCE PROVIDED BY THE OWNERS? 
64 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORIING SERVICE, INC 
I t \ l\( If \M, i PI \( ! si IIC -12 
s\LI I \KI i , n M \H Mi l l 
f S O I ) ^I < > - V 
1 
2 
3 
4 ' 
i 
5 i 
i 
6 
7 ! 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A YES . 
Q MR. KETTLE, LET'S GO BACK TO THE CHANGES 
THAT WERE MADE IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT, THE 1931 LEASE 
AGREEMENT. FOR INSTANCE, WHY DID IT CHANGE? WHY DID 
YOU FEEL A CONCERN TO CHANGE YARD SURFACING FROM A 
S OBLIGATION? 
TIONS OF OTHER LEASES, 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE LANDLORD' 
A I DO A LOT OF NEGOTIA 
AS HAS BEEN MENTIONED, AND WE HAD A FACILITY THAT WE 
HAD JUST HAD PROBLEMS ON THAT, AND, OF COURSE, THAT 
WAS A NEW STRUCTURE. THIS WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE 
YEARS LATER. WE WERE NEGOTIATING THIS AND WANTED TO 
MAKE SURE THAT IT WAS CLEAR THA|" IT WAS THEIR 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT PROBLEM, 
Q WOULD THE SAME BE TRUE FOR THE OTHER 
CHANGES, THE LIGHT GLOBES, THINGS LIKE THAT? 
A YES . 
Q I THINK YOU SAID THAT YOU WERE PART OF 
SALT LAKE MENTAL HEALTH AS OPPOSED TO COPPER MOUNTAIN 
EARLIER; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES . 
Q WERE YOU PERFORMING THE SAME SORT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES? 
A YES . 
Q AS PART OF SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, 
WERE YOU EVER MADE AWARE OF AN INTENT WHERE SALT LAKE 
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UNDERSTANDING ABOUT HOW THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS GOING 
TO CHANGE? 
A WE WERE GOING TO TRY TO GET A BETTER RATE, 
AND WE WERE GOING TO TRY AND SHIFT MOST OF THE --
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE TELEPHONE, MOST OF THE 
6 MAINTENANCE AND INSURANCE AND UTILITIES TO THE 
7 [ LANDLORD. 
Q THAT WAS YOUR INTENTION? 
A YES . 
Q WERE YOU AWARE AT THE TIME THAT YOU ENTERED 
n INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH DRS . ANDERSON AND PACKER 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
ABOUT THE VACANCIES IN THE UPPER LEVEL OF THE OFFICE 
BUILDING? 
A YES. 
Q MR. GILBERT, I'M GOING TO HAND YOU WHAT'S 
BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT k. THAT'S A COPY 
17 i OF THE 1981 LEASE AGREEMENT. WOULD YOU PLEASE TURN 
TO PAGE 3 OF THAT AGREEMENT. WOULD YOU LOOK AT 
PARAGRAPH 9. IN PARAGRAPH 9, WHO DOES IT INDICATE 
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING FIRE INSURANCE ON THE 
21 , PERSONAL PROPERTY? 
22 ' MR. BENNETT: YOUR HONOR, THE DOCUMENT 
23 \ SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. 
24 ' THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
I 
25 ' Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) THE DOCUMENT INDICATES 
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PROPERTY FIRE INSURANCE? 
MR. BENNETT: YOUR HONOR, I THINK HE'S 
LEADING THE WITNESS AT THIS POINT IN TIME. I WOULD 
OBJECT. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
Q CBY MR. JOHNSON) DO YOU RECALL IF YOU 
PERSONALLY WORKED WITH DOUG KETTLE IN DRAFTING THE 
CHANGES THAT APPEAR IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT? 
A YES . 
Q WERE THOSE DECISIONS THAT THE TWO OF YOU 
REACHED TOGETHER? 
A YES . 
Q DID THE DOCUMENT YOU PRESENTED TO 
DRS. ANDERSON AND PACKER ACCURATELY REFLECT THE 
INTENTIONS THAT YOU AND MR. KETiTLE HAD CONCERNING 
THE NEW ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES? 
A YES . 
Q DID YOU INTEND TO SHIFT SOME 
RESPONSIBILITIES FROM THE OLD LEASE AGREEMENT TO THE 
LANDLORDS AND THE NEW LEASE AGREEMENT? 
MR. BENNETT: YOUR HONOR, AGAIN IT'S 
LEADING. 
THE COURT: IT IS LEADING. SUSTAINED, 
MR. JOHNSON. 
Q CBY MR. JOHNSON) WHAT WAS YOUR 
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1 ; MAKE ANY CLOSING COMMENTS? 
2 • MR. BENNETT: P L E A S E . 
3 • THE COURT: IF SO, DO YOU WAIVE THE 
i 
4 REPORTER? 
5 1 MR. BENNETT : YES . 
6 THE COURT: VERY WELL. THANK YOU. 
7 (CLOSING ARGUMENTS BY CO U N S E L . ) 
t 
8 | THE COURT: COUNSEL, WE WILL BE IN RECESS 
9 i WHILE I CONSIDER MY RULING ON THI S . STAY IN THE 
10 AREA, PLEASE. 
11 j (A RECESS WAS T A K E N . ) 
12 j THE COURT: THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL ARE 
13 [ PRESENT. HAVING REVIEWED THE FILE IN THIS MATTER, 
14 RECEIVED AND REVIEWED THE EXHIBITS AND NOW HAVING 
15 HEARD THE EVIDENCE, THIS COURT IS PREPARED TO RULE. 
16 THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION SEEK EQUITABLE RELIEF 
17 j TO REFORM THE LEASE AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT k, OF MARCH 1, 
18 ; 1931, BETWEEN FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES AS LANDLORD 
I 
19 AND SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AS TENANT. 
20 SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPH 9 THEREOF WHEREIN IT IS CLEARLY 
21 AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY SET FORTH INTER ALIA THAT THE 
22 LANDLORD IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING PERSONAL 
23 PROPERTY INSURANCE AT ITS OWN EXPENSE FOR SALT LAKE 
j 
24 COUNTY. , 
, i 
25 BOTH PARTIES THROUGH PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ; 
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1 AND TRIAL BRIEFS SUBMITTED IN THIS MATTER HAVE 
2 ACKNOWLEDGED THAT UTAH LAW PROVIDES THAT THE 
3 ' PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF IS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
4 EVIDENCE REFERRED TO IN THE CASE OF NESBITT VS. 
5 ' HODGES, THE SEMINAL CASE IN THIS AREA, 307 P.2D 620, 
6 1957, AS "CLEAR, DEFINITE, AND CONVINCING/ 1 TO 
7 ESTABLISH EITHER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT OR A 
l 
8 ' UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF FACT COUPLED WITH FRAUD OR 
9 , INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE OTHER PARTY. 
10 I THE FORMER THEORY, MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT 
11 ENCOMPASSES THE SO-CALLED SCRIVENER'S ERROR. THAT 
12 I I S A MISTAKE OR OVERSIGHT IN DRAFTING THE AGREEMENT. 
13 HOWEVER, AS COUNSEL, MR. BENNETT, CANDIDLY CONCEDED 
14 ' IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, THIS IS NOT A CASE OF MUTUAL 
15 MISTAKE OF FACT. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY INDICATES TO 
15 THIS COURT'S SATISFACTION THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY DID 
17 NOT COMMIT A MISTAKE IN ITS PREPARATION OF THE 
'8 AGREEMENT. IT WAS THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY'S 
19 INTENT TO SHIFT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY INSURANCE 
20 OBLIGATION, AMONG OTHERS, TO THE LANDLORD. 
21 THE LATTER THEORY OF RECOVERY, SPECIFICALLY 
22 UNILATERAL MISTAKE, COUPLED WITH EITHER FRAUD OR 
23 INEQUITABLE CONDUCT BY THE DEFENDANT OR ITS AGENTS, 
24 IN THIS COURT'S VIEW, IS EQUALLY UNAVAILING TO THE j 
25 PLAINTIFFS. THE EVIDENCE HAS ESTABLISHED, AMONG • 
i 
i 
I 
! i 
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1 OTHER T H I N G S , BY CLEAR AND C O N V I N C I N G , BY THE CLEAR 
2 AND CONVINCING S T A N D A R D , THE F O L L O W I N G : 
3 , THE PARTIES WERE NOT IN A C O N F I D E N T I A L OR 
4 ' FICUCIARY RELATION TO ONE A N O T H E R . INDEED, THEY 
5 DEALT AT ARM'S LENGTH IN THEIR N E G O T I A T I O N S AND HAD 
6 AVAILABLE EQUAL O P P O R T U N I T I E S TO CONSULT E X P E R T S . 
7 THE DE F E N D A N T SOUGHT TO DRIVE A HARD 
8 BARGAIN AND WAS AWARE OF P L A I N T I F F ' S NEED TO BE 
9 FLEXIBLE IN THE LEASE TERMS DUE TO SUBSTANTIAL 
10 V A C A N C I E S . THE DEF E N D A N T T H R O U G H ITS AGENTS R E C A L L E D 
n SPECIFIC D I S C U S S I O N S REGARDING CHANGES IN THE LATTER 
12 ! LEASE AND WENT THROUGH THE DRAFT OF THE LEASE 
13 ; A G R E E M E N T S PAGE BY PAGE WITH THE PL A I N T I F F ' S A G E N T S 
14 WITH NO O B J E C T I O N S BEING V O I C E D . TO THE CONTRARY, 
15 THE PLAIN T I F F ' S A G E N T , W I T N E S S MERELY TESTIFIED THAT 
16 HE " U N D E R S T O O D " THE INSURANCE O B L I G A T I O N WAS 
17 U N C H A N G E D ; THAT HE PERUSED THE A G R E E M E N T BUT PAID 
i 
18 ' LITTLE OR NO A T T E N T I O N TO DETAILS OTHER THAN THE 
19 RENTAL RATE AND THE E X P A N D E D SPACE D E M A N D S . 
20 N E G O T I A T I N G AGENTS FOR THE COUNTY 
21 SPECIFICALLY S O U G H T , DUE TO U N S A T I S F A C T O R Y TERMS OF 
22 THE '73 LEASE AND PREVIOUS I N S U R A N C E , D I S T A S T E F U L 
23 INSURANCE EXPENSES TO SHIFT ALL M A I N T E N A N C E , 
24 i U T I L I T I E S , R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y TO THE LANDLORD, WHICH 
25 THEY DID, EXCEPT FOR THE T E L E P H O N E , AND WENT OVER 
1_0_3_ 
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THE CHANGES THOROUGHLY WITH THE LANDLORD BEFORE THE 
FINAL DOCUMENT WAS EXECUTED. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AS WELL AS OTHER 
FACTS IN THIS MATTER, THIS COU^T FINDS NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION ON THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
SEEKING REFORMATION, AND THIS COURT SPECIFICALLY 
RATIFIES THE CONTRACT AS WRITTEN AND RECEIVED AS 
EXHIBIT 4, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 18 OF 
THAT EXHIBIT AWARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT 
OF $4,000. THIS SUM INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY $68 IN 
COSTS. 
MR. FERGUSON, YOU PREPARE THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE. SUBMIT THEM 
TO MR. BENNETT FOR HIS APPROVAL AS TO FORM. 
ANY QUESTION, COUNSElL? 
MR. FERGUSON: NONE, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. BENNETT: NO. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. COURT WILL BE IN 
RECESS 
MR. FERGUSON: THANK YOU 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
T h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t i s made and e x e c u t e d t h i s 1 s t 
day o f March , 1 9 8 1 , b y a n d b e t w e e n S a l t Lake Coun ty , a body 
c o r p o r a t e a n d p o l i t i c o f t h e S t a t e o f Utah f o r i t s D i v i s i o n 
o f M e n t a l H e a l t h , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as LESSEE and 
F a s h i o n P l a c e A s s o c i a t e s , a U tah p a r t n e r s h i p , h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o a s LESSOR. 
W I ^ T r t E S S E T H : 
T h a t , f o r a n d i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p a y m e n t s t o be 
made h e r e u n d e r a n d t h e m u t u a l p r o m i s e s , c o v e n a n t s , a n d c o n d i t i 
h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h t o be k e p t and p e r f o r m e d , t h e p a r t i e s 
h e r e b y a g r e e a s f o l l o w s : 
1 . LESSOR does he reby l e a s e to LESSEE 13,581 square fe 
of o f f i c e space l o c a t e d a t 6065 South 3rd Eas t , Murray, Utah. 
The above -desc r ibed p r o p e r t y i s h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to in t h i 
l e a s e as the PREMISES. 
2 . LESSEE i s to have and to hold the PREMISES for the 
term of 3 yea r s b e g i n n i n g on March 1, 1981 through February 29 
1984. 
3 . LESSEE s h a l l pay *to LESSOR as r e n t dur ing the f i r s t 
year of t h i s l e a s e the sum of $88 ,276 .50 , the s a id sura to be 
p a i d in 12 equal monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s of $7 ,356 .38 , due in 
advance on the f i r s t day of each month. LESSEE s h a l l pay to 
LESSOR as r e n t d u r i n g the second yea r of t h i s l e a s e the sura 
of $97 ,104 .15 , the s a i d sum to be pa id in 12 equal monthly 
i n s t a l l m e n t s of $ 8 , 0 9 2 . 0 1 , due in advance on the f i r s t day 
of each month. LESSEE s h a l l pay to LESSOR as r e n t du r ing the 
t h i r d year of t h i s l e a s e the sum of $101,959.36 , the s a i d sum 
to be oaid in 12 equal monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s of^$jM*96 . 61 , "\jue f 
in advance on the f i r s t day of each month. LESSEE agrees to 
pay the f i r s t monthly i n s t a l l m e n t of $7 ,356.38 and the l a s t 
monthly i n s t a l l m e n t of $3 ,49^ . 16 jipon execu t ion of t h i s l e a s e . 
EXHIBIT 6 "T! 
4 . LESSOR a g r e e s to make such a l t e r a t i o n s and change 
the PREMISES as may be needfu l and n e c e s s a r y to adap t the si 
for the uses and purposes of LESSEE and to the s a t i s f a c t i o n 
LESSEE and t h e r e a f t e r to keep the s a i d PREMISES in a constar 
s t a t e of r e p a i r to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of LESSEE dur ing the cor 
of t h i s l e a s e . LESSOR he reby agrees to make the fo l lowing 5 
ments and a l t e r a t i o n s : 
a . I n s t a l l new p a n e l i n g in the o f f i c e s a t $13.00 pei 
shee t of p a n e l i n g . 
b . Demolish one pane l w a l l wi th window. Replace wit 
shee t rock s t u d w a l l ex tended 7-1/2 f e e t i n t o r e c e p t i o n arec 
New room s i z e w i l l be 9-1/2 f e e t by 20 f e e t . Carpe t i s to b 
r e l a i d in the h a l lway and LESSEE'S carpet a l lowance i s $17.C 
per ya rd . 
c . Demolish w a l l s su r round ing c l o s e t and the adjaceri 
bathroom to c r e a t e a ha l lway between the two s u i t e s of o f f i c 
d. Bui ld one 8 foot s t u d wa l l to p a r t i t i o n o f f small 
o f f i c e on west s i d e o f n o r t h e n t r y to i n c l u d e one window. 
e . To remove d o o r s , doorways and wa l l s on each s i d e 
h a l l main e n t r a n c e , n o r t h s i d e , back to c o r n e r . 
f. Remove door to conference room and r e p l a c e wi th 
sa lvage door of a p p r o p r i a t e swing to have-doors swing i n t o 
conference room i n s t e a d of swinging ou t i n t o h a l l . 
g. Remove a l l c a r p e t in main foyer as d i r e c t e d by LI 
and r e p l a c e wi th new c a r p e t of one c o l o r a t an a l lowance of 
per yard to LESSEE. 
h . To b u i l d one w a l l 16 fee t l ong with door and one 
5 fee t wi th door to b lock o f f r eco rds room in the basement . 
i . Remove 2 doors and 1 window in v e s t i b u l e entrance 
basement on sou th side. 
j . Shee t rock and tape a l l new c o n s t r u c t i o n - t o t i e i 
i n t o e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e . To r e p a i r suspended c e i l i n g s in ai 
a f f e c t e d by new c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d ' t o p a i n t a l l new c o n s t r u c t ] 
back to the c l o s e s t v e r t i c a l b reak in p l a n e . 
5. LESSEE agrees to pay*LESS0R the sum of $6300.00 
upon execution of this lease for the improvements and alterat 
set forth in paragraph 4 above. In the event that the imprc 
ments and alterations performed by LESSOR exceed or are less 
the sum of $6300.00, this agreement shall be amended accordir 
6. The premises shall be used by LESSEE, its departme 
agencies, or divisions foif administrative and business operat 
or for other functions and matters of LESSEE. 
7. At the expiration of the term of this lease, LESSE 
will yield and deliver up the PREMISES to LESSOR in as good o 
and condition as when the same were entered upon by the LESSE 
reasonable use and wear thereof, damage by fire and casualty 
the fault of LESSEE and damage by elements excepted therefron 
8. Responsibility for the maintenance shall be as ind 
LESSEE responsible for (T) and LESSOR responsible for (L): 
Roof (L) , Exterior Walls (L), Interior Walls (L), 
Structural Repair (L), Interior Decorating (L), 
Interior Painting (L), Yard Surfacing (L), 
Plumbing Lines, Equipment and Fixtures (L) , 
Heating and Air Conditioning Equipment (L), 
Electrical Lines and Equipment (L), Light Globes and 
Tubes (L), Glass Breakage (L), Trash Removal (L) 
Snow Removal (L), Janitor (L). 
9. Responsibility for utilities, taxes, and insurance 
shall be as indicated: 
Power (L), Heat (L), Water (L), Sewer (L), Telephone ( 
Real Property Tax (L), Increase in Real Property Tax ( 
Fire Insurance on Building (L), Fire Insurance on Pers 
Property (L), Glass Insurance (L). 
10. LESSOR hereby warrants that it is the fee simple 
with the legal right to lease said premises and agrees-to cor 
with all codes, ordinances, and state statutes applicable to 
ownership and operation of the premises at his sole expense. 
1 1 . LESSEE s h a l l have the r i g h t to s ign t h i s l e a s e c 
s u b l e t the PREMISES o r any p a r t t h e r e o f wi th the consen t of 
LESSOR ag rees n o t t o u n r e a s o n a b l y w i t h h o l d consen t t o ass ign 
s u b l e t . 
12. LESSOR covenan ts w i t h LESSEE t h a t upon f u l l y con; 
wi th and p r o p e r l y pe r fo rming a l l o f the t e r n s , c o n d i t i o n s , a 
covenants h e r e o f to be performed by LESSEE, s a i d LESSEE sha l 
and q u i e t l y enjoy the PREMISES for the terms s e t f o r t h he re i i 
1 3 . I f t he whole of t h e PREMISES s h a l l be t aken by ai 
p u b l i c o r governmenta l a u t h o r i t y under the power o f eminent 
domain, then the terra o f t h i s l e a s e s h a l l cease as of the dat 
pos se s s ion i s t aken by such a u t h o r i t y and the l e a s e payments 
hereunder s h a l l be p a i d through the da te o f p o s s e s s i o n and nc 
t h e r e a f t e r . I f o n l y a p a r t o f the PREMISES s h a l l be taken an 
the remainder n o t so taken remains t e n a n t a b l e for the purpose 
for which LESSEE has been u s i n g the PREMISES, then t h i s l e a s e 
s h a l l c o n t i n u e in f u l l force and e f f e c t as to s a i d remainder 
a l l of the p r o v i s i o n s h e r e o f s h a l l con t inue excep t t h a t the 
LESSOR ag ree s t h a t i t w i l l n e g o t i a t e a r e d u c t i o n in the l e a s e 
payments to be made h e r e u n d e r commensurate wi th the then appra 
value of the r e m a i n d e r . I f t h e remain ing p a r t of the PREMISE 
i s u n t e n a n t a b l e f o r LESSEE'S p u r p o s e s , Ch-en LESSEE may termii 
t h i s l e a s e by g i v i n g w r i t t e n n o t i c e t h e r e o f to LESSOR. The t< 
"eminent domain" as used in t h i s pa rag raph s h a l l i n c l u d e t he 
e x e r c i s e of any s i m i l a r governmenta l power and any purchase oi 
a c q u i s i t i o n in l i e u t h e r e o f by a governmental e n t i t y . 
14. I f the demised PREMISES a re comple te ly d e s t r o y e d t 
f i r e or o t h e r c a s u a l t y , t h i s l e a s e s h a l l t e r m i n a t e on the day 
such f i r e o r c a s u a l t y and no r e n t a l amount s h a l l acc rue or be 
paid by LESSEE on t h i s l e a s e t h e r e a f t e r . In the even t of p a r t 
d e s t r u c t i o n o r damage so as to r e n d e r the PREMISES t o t a l l y o r 
p a r t i a l l y u n t e n t a b l e , e i t h e r p a r t y nay t e r m i n a t e t h i s l e a s e by 
g iv ing w r i t t e n n o t i c e t h e r e o f to the o t h e r p a r t y w i t h i n 15 day 
a f t e r s a i d p a r t i a l d e s t r u c t i o n o r damage and no r e n t a l amount 
shall accrue or be paid bir LESSEE on this lease after the 
specified termination date. In the event of either of the 
foregoing terminations, LESSEE shall not be liable for damage 
of any kind because of such terminations. Upon termination, 
LESSEE shall relinquish possession of the PREMISES. 
15. In the event of failure by LESSOR to provide any 
services, utility maintenance, or repairs required under this 
agreement and said failure remaining uncorrected after writte 
notice to LESSOR, LESSEE shall have the right to secure said 
services and utilities, maintenance or repairs, and to deduct 
the costs thereof from rental payments. 
16. (a) LESSEE shall indemnify and save LESSOR harmle 
from all loss, damage, liability, or expense incurred by LESS( 
due to the exclusive negligent acts or omissions to act of 
LESSEE, its officers, employees, or agents arising out of 
LESSEE'S use or operation of the PREMISES and shall not permit 
any lien or other claim or demand to be enforced against the 
PREMISES by reason of LESSEE'S use of the PREMISES. 
(b) LESSOR shall indemnify and save LESSEE harmles 
from all loss, damage, liability, or expense incurred by LESSE 
due to the exclusive negligent acts or omissions to act of 
LESSOR, its officers, employees, or agents arising out of 
LESSOR'S use or ownership of the PREMISES. 
(c) LESSOR agrees that in the event any lien, clai 
or demand is enforced against the PREMISES because of LESSOR'S 
ownership thereof, which lien, claim, or demand shall deprive 
LESSEE of its use or possession of the PREMISES thereupon, thi; 
lease shall immediately terminate and LESSEE shall not be liabl 
for lease payments after the termination date. 
17. It is agreed tha^ t the waiving of any of the covenar 
of this lease by either party shall be limited to the particula 
instance and shall not be deemed to waive any of the other brea 
of such covenant or any provision therein contained. 
18. In the event either party shall enforce the te 
of this lease by a suit or otherwise, the party at fault si 
pay costs and expenses incident thereto including reasonab] 
attorney's fees. 
19. The covenants and agreements contained in this 
lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be bindi 
upon the parties hereto, their heirs, distributees, executo 
administrators, legal representatives, assigns, and upon th 
respective successors in interest, except as otherwise expri 
hereinbefore provided. 
20. This lease agreement may be terminated by eithei 
party by sending written notice to the other party at least 
days in advance of the desired cancellation or termination d 
21. All notices or other communications hereunder sh 
be in writing and may be given by -delivery in person or by 
registered mail, return receipt requested, to the parties as 
follows: 
LESSOR: Fashion Place Associates 
6065 South Third East 
Murray, Utah 
LESSEE: Division of Mental Health 
6065 South Third East 
Murray, Utah 
and 
S a l t Lake County A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S e r v i c e s Department 
Real E s t a t e D i v i s i o n 
135 East 2100 South , B u i l d i n g #3 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84115 
22. I t i s e x p r e s s l y unde r s tood and agreed between the 
p a r t i e s h e r e t o t h a t t h i s l e a s e agreement supercedes the t h r e e 
p r i o r l e a s e agreements and a l l amendments t h e r e t o between the 
p a r t i e s . 
23 . LESSEE s h a l l have an o p t i o n to purchase the PREMTi 
or any p a r t t h e r e o f d u r i n g the term of t h i s l e a s e agreement fc 
the f a i r market va lue of the r e a l p r o p e r t y and the b u i l d i n g at 
the t i r e t h a t LESSEE e x e r c i s e s i t s o p t i o n . The f a i r market va 
p u r c h a s e p r i c e s h a l l b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e a v e r a g e o f t h e a 
o f an a p p r a i s e r c h o s e n b y LESSOR, an a p p r a i s e r c h o s e n by L 
and an a p p r a i s e r c h o s e n j o i n t l y by LESSOR and LESSEE. The 
marke t v a l u e p u r c h a s e p r i c e s h a l l be d e c r e a s e d by a n y impri 
made a n d / o r p a i d f o r by LESSEE d u r i n g t h e t e r m o f t h i s l e a s e 
and f u r t h e r d e c r e a s e d by a p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e l e a s e payments 
u n d e r t h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t , s a i d p e r c e n t a g e t o be a g r e e d up 
t h e p a r t i e s a n d made a p a r t o f t h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t b y amen 
t h e r e t o . T h i s o p t i o n t o purchase i s sub jec t to LESSOR'S des i re to 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF t h e p a r t i e s h a v e s u b s c r i b e d t h e i r 
h e r e o n a n d h a v e c a u s e d t h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t t o be d u l y execi 
on t h e day a n d y e a r f i r s t a b o v e w r i t t e n , 
LESSEE: 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
W i l l i a m iL. Dunn, Chai rman 
Boa rd o f Coun ty Commiss ione 
— f V L ^>N^_ *-.r K_- SJ—t •' 
ATTEST: 
Salt Lake County Commissioner 
W. Sterling Evans 
Salt Lake County Clerk 
LESSOR: 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES 
Robert Anderson, General Part 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
County o f S a l t Lake ) 
0 n
 t h i s day o f March , 1 9 8 1 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b 
ne Rober t Anderson"! t h e s i g n e r o f t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , wh< 
by me d u l y s w o r n , d i d s a y t h a t he i s t h e C e n e r a l P a r t n e r o f Fa: 
P l a c e A s s o c i a t e s , a p a r t n e r s h i p and t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m t 
was du ly a u t h o r i z e d by t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a t a l a w f u l m e e t i n g dul} 
o r by a u t h o r i t y o f i t s b y l a w s a n d s i g n e d i n b e h a l f o f s a i d p a r t 
My cor sm ' s s ion e x p i r e s : N o t a r y r u b Y i c 
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t L i k e C o u n t y , Ut 
' ; Approve .-1 -*• tC rOI Ut 
•.. : \-,s^%,'~' Ot.»<". 
/ 
RAN i.ai98" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Consolidated Case No. 
C-84-302 
CRAIG DeHART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-84-3100 
STEVEN J. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al, 
Defendants. 
Civ i l No. C-84-3223 
rvHRIT 
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RONALD K. GEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
THOMAS C. SORENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al, 
Defendants. 
Civi l No. C-84-3275 
Civi l No. C-84-3355 
This ma t t e r i s before the cou r t on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment f i l e d by defendant Sa l t Lake County/Salt Lake County 
Mental Hea l th . A hea r ing on t h e Motion was he ld on January 
5, 1987. After o r a l argument the Court took the matter under 
advisement t o review the lengthy legal a u t h o r i t i e s submitted. 
The Court finds t h a t there are genuine issues of mater ia l fact 
concerning the i n t en t of the p a r t i e s . Accordingly, defendant 's 
Motion for Summary Judgment i s denied. 
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FACTS 
This case is a subrogation action for property damage and 
business interruption brought by Safeco Insurance Company, in 
the name of its insureds, the owners of the building, against 
defendant Salt Lake County/Salt Lafce County Mental Health, a 
tenant of the building. 
In 1978, the defendant entered into a lease with the plaintiffs, 
owners of the Fashion Place Professional Building, and began 
occupying a portion of the building. On May 1, 1983, a fire 
destroyed the building. Following the fire, Safeco Insurance 
Company, as insurer of the building for the owners, expended 
sums to rebuild the building and to compensate the owners for 
personal property losses and busiriess interruption losses. 
Safeco Insurance Company then instituted this lawsuit, to recoup 
the losses sustained as a result of the alleged negligence of 
Salt Lake County. 
The issue presented to the Court is whether defendant Salt 
Lake County is a coinsured of the plaintiffs, and thus whether 
Safeco Insurance Co. is precluded from pursuing this subrogation 
action. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. ABSENT AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT, A TENANT IS PRESUMED A COINSURED 
OF THE LANDLORD 
The rule is well established that an insurer cannot recover 
by means of subrogation against its own insured, or a coinsured 
under the policy. Board of Education v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246, 
1247 (Utah 1977) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall of Idaho, Inc., 
757 F.2d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985); Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Alaska 1981); 
Sutton v. Jondahl. 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla.App. 1975), Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that "where 
an insurance company attempts to recover, as a subrogee, from 
a coinsured under a fire insurance policy, the action must fail 
in the absence of design or fraud on the part of the coinsured." 
Hales, 566 P.2d at 1247. 
Moreover, in cases where a landlord is obligated to provide 
fire insurance on the leased premises, the landlord is presumed 
to carry insurance for the tenant's benefit, and thus the tenant 
is presumed to be a coinsured, in the absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary. Alaska Ins., 623 P. 2d at 1218; Rizzuto 
v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979) (citing 
Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270, 278 (Mo. 1965)); 
Monterey Corp. v. Hart, 216 Va. 843, 224 S.E.2d 142, 146 (1976); 
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Sutton, 532 P.2d at 482; accord, R. Keeton, Insurance Law, Section 
4.4(b) at 210 (1971) (suggesting adoption of rule to bar landlord's 
insurer from proceeding against negligent tenant when lease 
is ambiguous and insurance policy is silent or amgiguous). 
In this case, it is clear that plaintiff/landlord assumed 
an obligation to provide fire insurance for both the leased 
premises and the personal property of Salt Lake County.1 Accord-
ingly, the defendant/tenant is presumed a coinsured, thus barring 
any action by means of subrogation on the part of the insurer, 
unless the parties expressly contracted otherwise. The pivotal 
question, therefore, is whether defendant, Salt Lake County, 
and plaintiffs, owners of the Fashion Place Professional Building, 
expressly contracted that Salt Lake County would assume liability 
for fire damage resulting from its own negligent acts. 
Paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement between the plaintiff/ 
landlord and the defendant/tenant provides: 
9. Responsibility for utilities, taxes, 
and insurance shall be as indicated: 
Power (L), Heat (L), Water (L), 
Sewer (L), Telephone (T), Real 
Property Tax (L), Increase in 
Real Property Tax (L) , Fire Insurance 
on Building (L), Fire Insurance 
on Personal Property (L), Glass 
Insurance (L). 
(Emphasis added) 
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II. AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
A. Provisions of Lease 
In recent years several courts have considered whether 
to deny a cause of action to landlords and the right of subrogation 
to their insurers when the landlord covenants to carry fire 
insurance on the leased premises and the fire damage is allegedly 
due to the negligence of the tenant. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall 
of Idaho, Inc. , 757 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) ; Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P. 2d 1216 (Alaska 1981); Rizzuto 
v. Morris. 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979); Sutton 
v. Jondahl. 532 P.2d 478 (Okla.App. 1975). 
In Alaska Ins., the most analogous case, the landlord1s 
insurer brought an action against the insured1 s tenant for negligence 
in causing fire loss. In determining whether to deny the cause 
of action, the Alaska Ins. court stated the controlling principle 
as follows: 
Absent an express provision in the lease 
establishing the tenant's liability for 
loss from negligently started fires, the 
trend has been to find that the insurance 
obtained was for the mutual benefit of both 
parties, and that the tenant "stands in 
the shoes of the insured landlord for the 
limited purpose of defeating a subrogation 
claim." 
Alaska Ins., 623 P.2d at 1218 (citations omitted) (Emphasis 
added). 
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T h i s C o u r t a g r e e s w i th t h e A l a s k a Supreme C o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t 
of t h e a p p l i c a b l e l aw, b u t a p p l i e s t h i s p r i n c i p l e d i f f e r e n t l y . 
1 
The l e a s e a t i s s u e in Alaska I n s . and t h e l e a s e p r o v i s i o n s 
i n t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h i s Court a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . Both 
l e a s e s c o n t a i n a r e d e l i v e r y c l a u s e s t a t i n g t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g 
w o u l d b e r e t u r n e d i n good c o n d i t i o n , e x c e p t i n g f a i r wear and 
t e a r o r damage c a u s e d by f i r e , p r o v i d e d t h o s e damages d i d n o t 
a r i s e f rom t h e d i r e c t n e g l i g e n c e of t h e l e s s e e . 2 Both l e a s e s 
a l s o c o n t a i n an i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n a g r e e m e n t whe reby t h e l e s s e e 
a g r e e d t o i ndemni fy and ho ld t h e l e s s o r h a r m l e s s from and a g a i n s t 
l o s s , d a m a g e and l i a b i l i t y a r i s i n g from t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of 
The r e d e l i v e r y p r o v i s i o n i n A l a s k a I n s . p r o v i d e s : 
I I . COVENANTS OF THE LESSEE: 
b . L e s s e e s h a l l u s e s a i d p r e m i s e s f o r l a w f u l b u s i n e s s 
p u r p o s e s and w i l l l e a v e s a i d p r e m i s e s a t 
t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h i s l e a s e i n a s g o o d 
a c o n d i t i o n a s r e c e i v e d , e x c e p t i n g f a i r 
w e a r a n d t e a r a n d / o r l o s s o r damage c a u s e d 
b y f i r e , e x p l o s i o n , e a r t h q u a k e o r o t h e r 
c a s u a l t y ; p r o v i d e d t h a t s\ ;ch c a s u a l t y was 
n o t c a u s e d by t h e n e g l i g e n t ^ c t of t h e L e s s e e , 
i t s employees o r a g e n t s . . . | . 
A l a s k a I n s . , 623 P .2d a t 1218. Tl^e r e d e l i v e r y p r o v i s i o n 
i n t h i s c a s e p r o v i d e s : 
7 . At t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e t e r m of t h i s 
l e a s e , LESSEE w i l l y i e l d a n d d e l i v e r up 
t h e PREMISES t o LESSOR ifi a s g o o d o r d e r 
a n d c o n d i t i o n a s when e n t e r e d upon by t h e 
LESSEE, r e a s o n a b l e u s e anpi w e a r t h e r e o f , 
damage by f i r e and c a s u a l t y n o t t h e f a u l t 
o f LESSEE and damage by e l e m e n t s e x c e p t e d 
t h e r e f r o m . 
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the lessee.3 Additionally, both lease agreements contain a 
provision that the landlord would obtain and keep in force a 
policy of insurance to cover loss by fire,4 
The indemnification provision in Alaska Ins. states: 
II. COVENANTS OF THE LESSEE: 
c. Lessee agrees t o indemnify and hold Lessor harmless 
from and against loss , damage and l i a b i l i t y 
a r i s i n g from the neg l i gen t a c t of Lessee, 
i t s agents , employees, or c l i e n t s ; 
Id . a t 1218. Similarly, the indemnification provision 
in t h i s case s t a t e s : 
16(a) LESSEE s h a l l indemnify and save 
LESSOR harmless from a l l lo s s , damage, l i a b i l i t y , 
or expense incur red by LESSOR due t o t h e 
e x c l u s i v e n e g l i g e n t a c t s or omissions t o 
a c t of LESSEE, i t s o f f i c e r s , employees, 
or agen ts a r i s i n g out of LESSEE'S use or 
o p e r a t i o n of t h e PREMISES and s h a l l not 
permi t any l i e n or o the r claim or demand 
t o be enforced against the PREMISES by reason 
of LESSEE!S use of the PREMISES. 
The insurance clause in Alaska Ins . provides: 
III. MUTUAL COVENANTS OF LESSOR AND LESSEE: 
c . Lessor agrees t o pay a l l t axes and assessments made 
a g a i n s t and l e v i e d upon s a i d p r o p e r t y . 
Lessor sha l l obtain and keep in force during 
the term of t h i s lease a policy or p o l i c i e s 
of i n s u r a n c e cover ing l o s s or damages t o 
t h e premises p rov id ing p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
a l l p e r i l s and r i sks including but not l imi ted 
t o t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of f i r e , extended 
coverage, vandalism and malicious mischief. . . . 
I d . a t 1219. The insurance c lause in t h e case a t 
bar provides: 
9. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y for u t i l i t i e s , t a x e s , 
and insurance shal l be as indicated: 
Power (L), Heat (L), Water (L) , 
Sewer (L ) , Te lephone (T) , Real 
P r o p e r t y Tax ( L ) , I n c r e a s e i n 
Real Prcperty Tax (L) , Fire Insurance 
on Bu i ld ing (L), F i re Insurance 
on P e r s o n a l Proper ty (L), Glass 
Insurance (L). 
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I n A la ska I n s . . t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t " t h e r e d e l i v e r y 
and i n d e m n i t y p r o v i s i o n s r e l i e d upon by AIC [ i n s u r e r ] , when 
r e a d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e of I I I . c , f a i l 
t o c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h RCA's [ t e n a n t ' s ] l i a b i l i t y f o r f i r e damage 
c a u s e d by i t s own n e g l i g e n c e . 1 1 A l a ska I n s . , 623 P . 2d a t 1219. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e A l a s k a c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e i n s u r e r c o u l d n o t 
e x e r c i s e t h e r i g h t of s u b r o g a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e t e n a n t t o r e c o v e r 
f o r t h e n e g l i g e n c e and a f f i rmed t h e t r i l a l c o u r t ' s g r a n t of summary 
j u d g m e n t a s t o t h i s i s s u e . I d . a t 1220. 
C o n t r a r y t o t h e p o s i t i o n t a k e n by t h e m a j o r i t y i n i n t e r p r e t i n g 
t h e r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e l e a s e | a t i s s u e i n A l a s k a I n s . , 5 
t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h e s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s of t h e l e a s e a t b a r 
t o b e i n c b n f l i c t . I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r e d e l i v e r y and i n d e m n i t y 
p r o v i s i o n s i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e , t h e C o u r t 
C h i e f J u s t i c e R a b i n o w i t z , d i s s e n t i n g , found t h a t t h e 
p a r t i e s d i d i n c l u d e an e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n i n t h e l e a s e 
e s t a b l i s h i n g l i a b i l i t y on t h e t e n a n t f o r f i r e s c a u s e d 
b y t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of t h e t e n a n t . The d i s s e n t 
f u r t h e r n o t e d , however , t h a t i f | t h e l e a s e p r o v i s i o n s 
w e r e f o u n d i n c o n s i s t e n t , s u c h w o u l d l e a v e g e n u i n e 
i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n t e n t of t h e 
p a r t i e s a n d summary judgment wo^ld be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
A l a s k a I n s . , 623 P .2d a t 1220. 
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finds there is an ambiguity in the lease• The landlord did 
not specifically and expressly reserve its insurer's rights 
to subrogate against its tenant for fires negligently caused. 
Absent such an express agreement, the Court is unable to determine 
from the lease itself what the parties intended. Accordingly, 
it is appropriate to look beyond the four corners of the lease 
and consider extrinsic evidence as to who the parties intended 
to bear the burden of loss in the case of a fire allegedly caused 
by a negligent tenant, but covered by the landlord's insurance. 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). 
B. Intent of Parties 
The Court's review of the cases in this area leads her 
to conclude that the intent of the parties is the primary factor 
considered by the courts in construing exemption provisions 
of the parties' lease. Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 
592 P.2d 688, 691 (1979); see alsof Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Alaska 1981) (Rabinowitz, 
C.J., dissenting). The facts thus far developed are insufficient 
to determine the intent of the parties. Accordingly, the Court 
denies defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In an effort, 
however, to aid the parties in the development of the facts 
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regarding the intent of the parties, the Court notes several 
factors considered by the Rizzuto court which this Court finds 
persuasive. 
In Rizzuto, lessors brought an action against the lessee 
for losses allegedly sustained due to the destruction of a building 
in a fire caused by the negligence of the lessee's employee. 
The Washington Court of Appeals determined that the lessee was 
not liable for the fire damage, and the insurance company had 
no right of subrogation, based upon the undisupted testimony 
of the parties at trial regarding their intentions. Id. , 22 
Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d at 691. The factors considered by the 
Rizzuto court in determining the intent of the parties include: 
1. Whether the lessors had taken the responsibility of 
insuring the leased building in an adequate amount against the 
risk of fire; 
2. If so, whether the lessee was aware of this action; 
3. Whether the lessee understood the lease to exempt 
it from liability for all fires including those of negligent 
origin; 
4. Whether the lessor adjusted its rental rate upward 
to compensate for the fire insurance coverage. Id., 22 Wash. 
App. 951, 592 P.2d at 690. 
FASHION PLACE V, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE TWELVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CONCLUSION 
T h e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e s t h a t s h e a g r e e s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t 
of p o l i c y a s summarized by Keeton , I n s u r a n c e Law, S e c t i o n 4 . 4 ( b ) 
a t 210 ( 1 9 7 1 ) : 
P r o b a b l y i t i s u n d e s i r a b l e , from t h e p o i n t 
o f v i e w of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , t h a t t h e r i s k 
of l o s s f rom a f i r e n e g l i g e n t l y c a u s e d by 
a l e s s e e b e u p o n t h e l e s s e e r a t h e r t h a n 
t h e l e s s o r ' s i n s u r e r . Al lowing t h e l e s s o r ' s 
i n s u r e r t o p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e i s 
s u r e l y c o n t r a r y t o e x p e c t a t i o n s of p e r s o n s 
o t h e r t h a n t h o s e who h a v e b e e n e x p o s e d t o 
t h i s b i t o f l aw e i t h e r d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s 
f o r a l e a s e o r e l s e a f t e r a l o s s . . . . 
[ P ] e r h a p s [ t h e c o u r t s ] shou ld a t l e a s e a d o p t 
a r u l e a g a i n s t a l l o w i n g t h e l e s s o r ' s i n s u r e r 
t o p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e when l e a s e 
p r o v i s i o n s a r e a m b i g u o u s i n t h i s r e g a r d 
and t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s s i l e n t o r a m b i g u o u s . 
The C o u r t n o t e s t h a t , a b s e n t an e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n i n t h e l e a s e 
t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e l e s s e e i s a c o i n s u r e d 
of t h e l e s s o r , t h u s b a r r i n g a s u b r o g a t i o n a c t i o n by t h e i n s u r e r 
a g a i n s t i t s own i n s u r e d . The C o u r t a l s o b e l i e v e s , h o w e v e r , 
t h a t t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e l e a s e shou ld be a b l e t o c o n t r a c t a r o u n d 
s u c h a p r e s u m p t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s 
a t t e m p t e d t o d o j u s t t h a t . 6 However, i n t h e C o u r t ' s v i e w t h e 
T h e C o u r t n o t e s t h a t t h e l e a s e a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e 
i s n o t a n a d h e s i o n c o n t r a c t ; r a t h e r , i t was p r e p a r e d 
and d r a f t e d by a t t o r n e y s f o r S a l t Lake Coun ty . P l a i n t i f f s • 
Memorandum i n O p p o s i t i o n , a t p . 1 8 . 
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provisions drafted are ambiguous. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence 
as to the parties' intentions must be considered and defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.j 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1987. 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS" 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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